1987

Giving Up the Ghost: Death in the Depression

Victoria Getis
Oberlin College

GIVING UP THE GHOST:
DEATH IN THE DEPRESSION

Victoria L. Getis

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Mr. Blodgett,

History Honors

OUTLINE OF GIVING UP THE GHOST

TABLES

GRAPHS

I said breakdowns come and breakdowns go
So what are you going to do about it
That's what I'd like to know.

~Paul Simon

YOU'RE INVITED

The time: 1920 to 1940
The place: Ohio - Oberlin, Canfield, and Waynesville
The subject: Ohio newspaper reports of homicide and suicide, with a few other items added

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"The majority of people were hit and hit hard. They were mentally disturbed you're bound to know, 'cause they didn't know when the end of all this was comin'. There was a lot of suicides that I know of. From nothin' else but just they couldn't see any hope for a better tomorrow."
-- Mary Owsley, in Hard Times, p. 46

The sun 'll come out tomorrow,
Bet your bottom dollar that tomorrow,
There'll be sun

"Thomas Courtney, who lives on the Maffit place on the Lytle road, and has been ill for the past six months, became very despondent and took his life Tuesday Afternoon. He had worked all of the morning in the hay field, and after dinner he wandered off. The family became suspicious, and started off on a hunt for him, and found him under a clump of willows in a ravine south of the house."
-- Miami Gazette, July 21, 1920

OLD CANFIELD TOWN HALL SCENE OF FATAL SHOOTING

Mike Bort shot and killed Morris Matlas of Youngstown at 9 p.m. Friday evening. There was bad feeling over a deal in horses. They were members of the same firm and suspected each other of wrongful dealings.
-- Mahoning Dispatch, June 12, 1936

MRS. HARDING TAKES OWN LIFE

Mrs. Cora M. Harding, 65, widow of the late John M. Harding, former prosecuting attorney of Lorain County, was found dead at her home in Lorain Sunday night, with a revolver in her hand and a bullet through her head. The coroner returned a verdict of suicide. Mrs. Harding lived alone and had been dead several days. Mr. Harding died in 1934.
-- Oberlin News-Tribune, May 18, 1937

Russell Freeman, 31, swallowed lysol. He worked in a barbershop and was an excellent workman. His family said he was not acting right since the holidays. He is the youngest of ten children.
-- Mahoning Dispatch, January 20, 1928

George W. Dewey, a resident of Oberlin shot himself through the head, using a shot gun. He was 71 years old. He had tried to kill himself once before, it is thought that the reason for his suicide is grief over the death of his wife.
-- Oberlin News, April 19, 1923

FATAL ENDING TO POKER GAME: Negro shot winner of poker game. Took money. Had a record of criminal activities.
-- Oberlin News, April 2, 1925

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SEVEN LOSE LEAVE BY ACTION OF COLLEGE

Seven professors were denied sabatticals so that the college can cut down on expenses. They are permitted to take sabatticals without pay, if they want.
-- Oberlin News, May 4, 1921

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The musical 'Annie' was produced in April, 1977. Based on Little Orphan Annie of Harold Gray's comic strip of the thirties, it is a demonstration of a current belief that there was hope, even in the depths of the depression. This sentiment is perhaps best expressed in the song "Tomorrow."

Woods Laver, a freshman at Oberlin College took his life by poisoning himself in his room at the Men's building early Monday morning. No apparent cause could be found. His roommate heard the body fall and went for help from the house manager, but Laver died before the doctor arrived. He had just spent a happy weekend at his home in Akron and he left many farewell notes.
-- Oberlin News-Tribune, May 18, 1937

HANGS HIMSELF IN JAIL

"Norman Terrell, 45, of Butternut Ridge, hung himself in the Elyria jail last week when he was arrested on a charge of driving his car while intoxicated. Terrell was a farmer."
-- Oberlin News, May 12, 1927

E. Wight Bakke reports that one of the subjects of his studies became a cemetery lot salesman because he figured everybody had to die, "and, so far as he could see, just about as many people die during a depression as any other time"
-- Bakke, Unemployed Worker, p. 214

DOUBLE TRAGEDY: caused by jealousy. Divorced man and divorced woman die in Dayton. Man shot woman and then committed suicide. Man from Waynesville.
-- Miami Gazette, March 17, 1926

United We Stand

Roosevelt

Confidence

The confidence of the American people in the President has become an inestimable aid to America's rehabilitation. That this Nation shall again assume its rightful place in the scheme of things Confidence must be absolute.

The colossal resources of this, the greatest Nation on earth are now solidly behind a definite plan of rehabilitation and reconstruction in the United States.

You must have confidence if you are to aid in attaining this great human benefit. Confidence in your Financial Institutions and their personnel is a necessary and important part that you and your community are designated to play.

Sane reasoning will justify your confidence.

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CANFIELD, OHIO

Forward America

9/8/33

4/20/35

"SOMETHING TO TIE TO"

in a World of Uncertainties



The Savings Account which you establish here is a staunch mooring for your reserve funds.

And all the while, year in, year out, your reserve is being strengthened by compound interest.

2½% Interest COMPOUNDED SEMI-ANNUALLY

FDIC MEMBER

Farmers National Bank

CANFIELD, OHIO

ATTEMPTED HOLD UP

"Miss Mary Elmore was walking on the sidewalk near her home on Morgan Street Monday night when a man threw a flashlight in her face and ordered her to throw up her hands. Miss Elmore thought the man was a neighbor attempting a joke and she pushed him to one side. When the command was repeated she again pushed the man aside. Another woman approached by this time and the fellow took to his heels."

-- Oberlin News, March 3, 1927

"A tramp printer, 56, unidentified, committed suicide by cutting his throat with a pocket knife at Wellington last Saturday night. He was released Saturday morning from the village jail at Wellington, where he had been kept the night before for protection from the cold."

-- Oberlin News, March 24, 1927

TAKES OWN LIFE

"Ill health is assigned as a cause for the suicide of Eugene Lewis, 63, Spencer farmer, who cut his throat."

-- Oberlin News, April 29, 1926

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IF YOU HAVE WORK, CALL NEWS-TRIBUNE

Names have been sent into the office of men desiring work. They need work in order to buy food. So, if you need workers, let us know.

-- Oberlin News-Tribune, March 27, 1930

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Just thinking about tomorrow,
Clears away the cobwebs and the sorrow
'Til there's none.

PITTSFIELD MAN, DESPONDENT, TAKES HIS LIFE WITH POISON

Frank Sheffield, 40, died of a dose of Paris Green and exposure. He was despondent because of recent ill health. Early in the morning he took poison, wandered in the woods in his night clothes until he was found and taken home, where he died.

-- Oberlin News, March 1, 1923

BEATS GIRL WHEN ATTACK REPULSED

Mary Iler, 22, was hitchiking back here from Chicago and was beaten by an unknown negro about 1 a.m. outside town.

-- Oberlin News-Tribune March 6, 1936

March 10: the report Mary Iler made of an attack was repudiated. The assault was actually an attempt to kill her by her paramour via a hired man.

"I didn't want to go on relief. Believe me, when I was forced to go to the office of the relief, the tears were running out of my eyes. I couldn't bear myself to take money from anybody for nothing. If it wasn't for those kids -- I tell you the truth -- many a time it came to my mind to go commit suicide. Than go ask for relief. But somebody has to take care of those kids."
-- Ben Isaacs, in Hard Times, p. 425

"John Shultz, 50, well known and highly respected in this community, was found dead at his home on the Bellbrook road, two miles northwest of here, Tuesday night. Coroner H. M. Williams reported Mr. Schultz had ended his life with a shotgun. The body was found by neighbors."
-- Miami Gazette, March 16, 1939

HOWARD THOMAS, 25, TAKES LIFE BY SHOOTING WHILE DESPONDENT; WAS SENIOR IN THE CONSERVATORY

"Howard L. Thomas of Piqua, a senior in Oberlin Conservatory of Music, died at Allen hospital about 10 o'clock Monday morning as a result of a wound inflicted when he shot himself some time Sunday night. Thomas used a 22 calibre target pistol and sent a pistol into his brain [sic]. Investigation by the coroner disclosed the fact that he had purchased the gun at an Oberlin store Saturday night.

"Thomas was found unconscious in his small coupe by the side of the road on Morgan street near the Oberlin Golf club grounds. It is believed that he shot himself late on Sunday night. Dr. Miller, who was called when Thomas was removed to the Allen hospital, states that Thomas' wound was fatal, but that exposure after the shooting hastened his death.

"Thomas was found at 6 a.m. Monday. It is thought he shot himself about 10 p.m. Sunday.

"Thomas, who was 25 and considered a brilliant student, left a letter to his mother in which he stated that he was taking his life because he was a nervous wreck and feared he would lose his mind. One instructor who had Thomas in his classes stated that he had seemed normal in recent days, while another thought he had not been entirely normal for two weeks or more. He was to have given his senior recital Tuesday evening.
-- Oberlin News, May 2, 1929

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In 1933, relief was working well in Ohio: in Oberlin the highest number of families in need - 150 - was reduced to only 48.
-- Oberlin News May 11, 1933

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GUARD SHOT: Merchant policeman shot by burglars. Surprised them when making his rounds. Fight, guard shot.
-- Miami Gazette, March 24, 1926

7/28/20

9/12/27

9a

When I'm stuck with a day that's gray and lonely
I just stick out my chin and grin and say
The sun'll come out tomorrow

Walter J. Byers, 60, was found shot to death in an orchard upon a neighboring farm, a gun at his side. The coroner returned a verdict of suicide.

-- Mahoning Dispatch, June 9, 1939

J.W. HAWKINS DROWNS HIMSELF IN PLUM CREEK

"J.W. Hawkins, colored, committed suicide by drowning in Plum Creek late Friday night or early Saturday morning. He had been in poor health for several weeks and it is thought that despondency over his illness caused him to take his life. he was 54 years of age.

"Mr. Hawkins came to Oberlin last December from his former home near Mount Pleasant, Ohio, and was making his home with his sister, Mrs. Martha Walker, 108 Locust street. Friday evening he disappeared from the Walker home and when he did not return they became alarmed. Relatives and friends searched but could not locate him. This morning (Tuesday) local police and the sheriff's office were notified and an organized search was started. Tuesday noon the body was found in Plum Creek in Caskey's Grove in about three feet of water. His hat, coat, and overcoat were on the bank of the creek. Coroner Miles Perry was called and gave his verdict as suicide by drowning.

-- Oberlin News, April 10, 1928

C.H. HUNGERFORD TAKES OWN LIFE; FUNERAL TODAY

Funeral services were held today for Clarence H. Hungerford, 51, who took his own life Friday evening at his home on Hamilton street.

"Mr. Hungerford had been despondent for some time. His wife, Bessie, had just filed suit for divorce on grounds of neglect and cruelty and Mr. Hungerford's act was believed to be the result of domestic troubles. Mr. and Mrs. Hungerford had been married twenty-seven years.

"A formal verdict of suicide was returned Saturday by Coroner S.C. Ward. Hungerford was found lying on the floor with two pillows under his head and a bullet wound above his right temple. A .32 calibre revolver lay by his side."

-- Oberlin News-Tribune, April 11, 1939

In the long run, we're all dead.
-- John Maynard Keynes

BECOMING DESPONDENT OVER HIS CONDITION FARMER TAKES OWN LIFE: Charles M. Hough, 87, hung himself. Health had been failing. Hung himself in barn. Left around 9 p.m. Found 15 minutes later. Prosperous farmer. Highly respected, well liked.

-- Miami Gazette, March 15, 1934

YOUTH IS SHOT IN ATTEMPTED HOLD UP SUNDAY

"Matt Gardner, one-armed gas station proprietor on the Oberlin road near the Elyria Country club, shot a youth Sunday forenoon in an attempted hold-up of his station. He held two others in the gang until the sheriff arrived, while a third youth, endeavoring to escape, was captured by County Prosecutor Don Myers who was playing golf nearby."

-- Oberlin News-Tribune, May 21, 1931

LEBANON MERCHANT COMMITS SUICIDE

"Louis Fred, 63 years old, well known businessman of Lebanon who had operated a dry goods store for 40 years, committed suicide by hanging himself last Saturday morning.

"He had left home at 7:30 a.m. When the store was found locked, friends investigated and found the body hanging in a closet on the second floor. Mr. Fred was born in Lithuania and came to the United States as a boy.

-- Miami Gazette, March 4, 1937

TAKES OWN LIFE

"Mrs. Myrtle J. Clancy, wife of William C. Clancy, former Oberlin resident, took her life with chloroform as she lay in bed at her home at 1833 East 97th street, Cleveland, sometime Monday morning. Mr. Clancy, who has been working on trees for Oberlin College here since the ice storms of last spring, was home Sunday night, but left for his work Monday morning without knowing his wife was dead. Mrs. Clancy was a daughter of Mr. and Mrs. F. C. Johnson of Bellefounte, Pa. Mr. Clancy states that her act was due to despondency following illness.

-- Oberlin News, June 28, 1928

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"A committee of 28 organized unemployed, headed by Dan Drozen, president, and Charles Shaffer, Camp Ross, waited on township trustee H.C. Clay Tuesday Morning at his home two miles north of the village and advised him that work offered on highways at 40 cents an hour had been refused and that no service would be rendered unless pay is fixed at 50 cents an hour. Teamster Spellman demanded $1 an hour for himself and the team. Mr. Clay plainly stated his position on demands made, saying that as a trustee he would not countenance the demands and that unless work is performed no grocery orders will be issued with his approval. There is little doubt that the other members of the board of trustees, E.R. Lynn and T.G. Stratford, will take the same position in the matter."

-- Mahoning Dispatch, May 4, 1934

4/23/37



Do little things hold you back?

THE little obstacles that hamper people and hold them back, very often vanish in the face of sound financial management.

By planning ahead . . . spending carefully . . . and saving regularly, countless men and women have freed themselves from trouble and worry. What they have done, you can do.

The first step is a savings account in this bank. Start yours now and add to it regularly. As it grows, financial worries will fade away, become trivial, finally disappear. You will be "on your way" once more.

2% Interest COMPOUNDED SEMI-ANNUALLY

Farmers National Bank
CANFIELD, OHIO

3/4/38

Every day ambitious men and women are stepping into new positions, entering new enterprises, progressing up the ladder of success. . . Your "big chance" may come tomorrow . . . next month . . . or a year from now. Will you be ready? If money is needed, will you have it? You will if you have a growing savings account at this bank.

2% Interest COMPOUNDED SEMI-ANNUALLY

Farmers National Bank
CANFIELD, OHIO

11a

Dan Drozen, leader of the Unemployed, was arrested for causing an annoyance. He is the organizer and president of the Unemployed. They struck for higher pay, but everyone else returned to work. He did not. He persisted and was arrested on order of the trustees.

-- Mahoning Dispatch, June 15, 1934

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CYRUS NEFF convicted on murder charge: for killing wife. Appealed case. Appeal denied. Sentenced to life imprisonment.

-- Mahoning Dispatch, June 30, 1933

"Andrew Matikonis, dairyman and farmer, committed suicide last Friday morning by hanging. His body, suspended from a rope fastened to a crosspiece on the second floor of the barn, was found by members of his family about 5 a.m. Friday.

"Matikonis had arisen about 4 o'clock and had gone out to take care of his morning's work. It was an hour later when his body was found. He had apparently placed the rope about his neck and jumped from a second story window, after first attaching the rope to a joist near the window.

"Matikonis had been in the dairy business for several years and had a milk route in Oberlin. He was about 50 and leaves a wife and several children. Coroner Perry rendered a verdict of death by suicide. No definite cause is known.

-- Oberlin News, August 29, 1929

When all is said and done, the death rate is still one hundred percent.

-- Neal Laurance

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The Grafton Savings and Banking Company was robbed after closing Saturday evening.

-- Oberlin News, April 9, 1925

Three men were caught trying to hold up a Toledo Bank and were identified as those who robbed the Grafton Bank in April. They were Robert Hartley, 19, William Hartley, 16, and George Mingione, 19. The older boys will be sentenced to 15 years at the Ohio penitentiary. It is uncertain what sentence the younger boy will receive.

-- Oberlin News, May 28, 1925

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So you gotta hang on 'til tomorrow
Come what may

FORMER OBERLIN MAN IS STABBED IN HEAD

"George A. Glenn, 34, who died in Elyria Memorial hospital Sunday night following an alleged assault, was the son of the late George Glenn, Sr., and was born in Oberlin.

"Glenn was found soaked in blood from wounds which were made by knife cuts and by the blows of a hammer. It occurred at the home of his divorced wife in Elyria. Inmates of the house declare that he was intoxicated and had precipitated a fight. The wife was a daughter of Flossie Simons Gayters, also a former Oberlin resident.

-- Oberlin News-Tribune, May 28, 1931

Washingtonville: Melvin Jones, 47, well known coal miner, in poor health for some time, committed suicide by shooting himself. He leaves five children and his wife.

-- Mahoning Dispatch, March 12, 1937

The depression was an exceptionally disagreeable experience.

-- John Kenneth Galbraith

Mrs. Clarabelle Lackey committed suicide at her home in Bellbrook, Friday morning. She lost her husband last March, and since then she has had quite a lot of trouble. Her son had pneumonia, her daughter just broke her arm. Her troubles were just too much for her.

-- Miami Gazette, July 4, 1923

NY: "George Bower was seventy-five years old and had several sons near Haverstraw, where he lived, who were glad to take care of him. He had a little money, too, so nobody in the town took him seriously six months ago when he began looking for work.

From early until late at night, in that six months, he paced the streets of Haverstraw. He called at the office of the interstate park commission and asked the clerk if he had a job for him.

The clerk answered "Yes," and Bower fell dead.

-- Oberlin News, April 20, 1925

WOMAN ENDS HER LIFE BY DROWNING IN SWIMMING POOL

Alice McCarven, 35, of Dayton drowned herself in the Delco Dell swimming 'pool early Sunday morning. She left her home Saturday night and was reported missing. She was despondent because of ill health and the loss of her job with Westinghouse Electric company. There were no marks of violence on her body.

-- Miami Gazette, June 20, 1932

The car of Otis Grant, a colored resident of Oberlin, was found in Columbus. Grant shot his wife and Mrs. John Robinson at the home of Mrs. Grant, North Main Street, last wednesday afternoon about 3:30. He used a 20-gauge shotgun.

"It is believed that Grant, who got into his car after the double murder and drove away after waving his hand to neighbors near the Grant home, drove to Columbus to get into touch with a brother who lives there. He was last seen here driving south on Professor Street.

"The murder is the outcome of a suit for divorce filed by Grant's wife. Grant is alleged to have threatened her with death as a result of her action. Mrs. Robinson, who was shot with Mrs. Grant, was employed by the latter to help in laundry work. The two women were at work when Grant entered the home and shot them. He left his gun outside the door after committing the murder. ...

"The Grants leave a daughter about 13 years of age. Mrs. Robinson leaves her husband and seven children. Mrs. Grant was 38 and Mrs. Robinson 54.

-- Oberlin News, May 29, 1928

ELYRIA MAN FOUND DEAD IN GREEN LINE TRACTION CAR

The body of George Hadaway of Elyria was found in a Cleveland Southwestern car at the barns Monday morning at 3:30. The body fell out of the toilet room when the porter opened the door in the course of his work of cleaning the car.

The coroner said death was due to acute indigestion.

-- Oberlin News, August 9, 1921

STUMP BLASTER KILLED

Michael Webber of Avon, was blown to pieces while blasting stumps Saturday on an Avon farm.

-- Oberlin News, June 29, 1921

"I was realizing that many and many other people are in the same boat. That gave me a little encouragement. I was looking at these people, waiting in line to get their relief, and I said, My God, I am not the only one."

-- from Hard Times, p. 246

Tomorrow, tomorrow, I love ya tomorrow
You're only a day away.

MATT GARDNER TAKES OWN LIFE; WIDELY KNOWN

Private funeral services for Matt Gardner, filling station owner and ex-cowboy, who was found dead in his bed Saturday with a bullet hole in his head, were held this afternoon at the Nicholls Funeral Home here. Coroner Ward returned a verdict of suicide. Worry over the health of his wife, who is ill in the hospital here was assigned as the cause.

Chief Deputy William G. Smith was called to Gardner's home by a neighbor. He reported that he found Gardner shot through the head in back of his ear, with a .38 calibre pistol.

The pistol was on the bed, Smith said. It was not immediately determined how long he had been dead, but Deputy Smith said he judged from appearances that Gardner probably died Thursday night. The light was on in his bedroom.

Gardner's fame became state-wide after he had shot or captured 19 persons who during the last half-dozen years attempted to holdup or burglarize his filling station.

His record includes two men killed, one by his pistol and another in a "shot-gun trap" he had rigged up to prevent burglaries.

His last vigilante activity was last December 13 when he shot one and captured three of a group of four Cleveland youths who set off a burglar alarm in an attempt to rob the station at night.

He twice sought the Democratic nomination for the office of Sheriff, but was defeated by Sheriff Grall in 1934 and in 1936. He was a native of Yuma, Colorado, and while in the West learned the ways of the ranger in handling firearms.

-- Oberlin News-Tribune, May 4, 1937

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DON'T TAKE LIFE
too seriously

You can't get out of it alive anyway, but you can leave your family in comfortable circumstances.

Call the GEO. G. PEAIRS, Dist. Agt. of NEW ENGLAND Mutual Life & Co. (Charter 1835). Lorain Co. Elyria, O. Phone 2686

-- Oberlin News, July 28, 1920

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[From a letter to President Roosevelt by M.L. (female adolescent), Detroit, Michigan]

"I know that you have a kind heart and wont refuse a girl that needs help Others are dressed but me with out a coat If I wont get any help from you Dear Mr. President than I will take my life away. I can't stand it no longer. We were thrown out on the street few times I hate to live the way I'm living now."

-- October 2, 1935

6/15/38

ECONOMICS OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION

The preceding section is the human evidence behind this paper: what did the Great Depression feel like? What was it like to live in a Hooverville? To travel across the country in a run-down jalopy? To jump freight trains and live in box cars? To go on relief? What impact did the depression have on the national and individual psyche? Many authors have dealt with these questions, so why do it again? First, this thesis represents a attempt to draw together all the information for myself. Second, it is also an endeavor to find what people considered then (and perhaps still do) most important in their lives. Third, it may lead to a deeper understanding of what sort of society entered the depression and how the depression changed it.

The first thing to be discussed is the economics of the depression. Most importantly, just what <u>is</u> a depression? No one seems to know. Economists have agreed on a definition for the term recession, but have not reached a consensus on the term depression. Five different handbooks of economics give five different definitions of the word ranging from "a severe slowdown in the economy," to "a long lasting recession in economic activity".[1] Perhaps the best way to define a depression is to list its characteristics. Generally, business activity is far below normal, there is great pessimism among business and consumers alike, there is a sharp curtailment of production, little capital investment, contraction of credit, falling prices, mass unemployment, and a high rate of business failures.

The causes of the Great Depression (popularly recognized as the decade between 1929 and 1939) have been debated for years.

No one will ever know for sure, I think, what the causes were. Of course, war debts, the stock market crash, cheap-money policies, the enormous speculation boom of the 1920s, were all contributing factors. Together they produced an international economic depression that affected most western countries. John Garraty, in his book The Great Depression, points out that national political leaders around the world were quick to deny that the depression could possibly have started in their respective countries. In any case, the factors causing it were out of any individual's control in late 1929. In the U.S. the measures President Herbert Hoover adopted were not sufficient to change the situation drastically.

The depression began at different times for different people in the U.S. Farmers were already having a hard time by the middle of the 1920s. Unemployment was rising from 1926 on, with a brief dip in 1929. The crash took place in 1929, but the banking system didn't hit rock bottom until the beginning of March, 1933. The accompanying graphs of trends in unemployment, wages, amounts held in deposit accounts, and business failures show the enormous rise in unemployment peaking in 1933, the downward trend and then secondary peak in 1938, and the rapid decline as the nation geared up for war. (See Graph 1) Wages (per capita income) were rising slowly until 1931, when they peaked and lost ground, dropping to the 1927 yearly wage in 1934. They peaked and dipped again in 1937 and thereafter rose steadily. (See Graph 2) The amount of money held in deposit accounts -- the nation's savings -- climbed steadily until 1930, fell to less

* CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE

20 Squares to the Inch



GRAPH 1: UNEMPLOYMENT RATES (% OF CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE)

GRAPH 2: AVERAGE YEARLY WAGES



than half its peak value in 1933, rose until 1937, getting back to pre-World War I values, dipped in 1938, and rose steadily from then on. (See Graph 3) By 1945, however, deposits were still lower than the 1929 level. Business failures are more erratic: from 1921 until 1929, businesses failed at about the rate of 100 for every 10,000 existing enterprises. In 1932 the rate reached its apex at 154 failures per 10,000 and for most of the thirties the rate was between 40 and 60. (See Graph 4) 1939 marked another bad year, but things got better as the nation moved into war. Taken together, all these economic measures seem to point to two nadirs of the depression -- one in 1932-1933, one in 1938-1939.

The depression happened to business and consumers alike. Few people escaped its influence. The Educational Policies Commission commented that "whatever this calamity was at the outset, it soon became many things -- a general melee -- wherein cause and effect were confused and indistinguishable. Very early it became apparent that no individual or institution could hope to escape its influence, and that many would do well not to lose their moorings entirely."[2] Samuel Stouffer and Paul Lazarsfeld, sociologists, likened the depression to a bomb dropped in the midst of society, and stated that social institutions and all human activity were profoundly affected.[3]

Although people tend to react differently to unaccustomed situations,[4] the depression affected most people in much the same ways. Individual responses varied, but there were only a few different patterns of responses and they didn't vary much from place to place.[5] In western countries, there was a decline in birth and marriage rates, and suicide rates rose. John Garraty



GRAPH 3: AMOUNT OF MONEY HELD IN DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS

GRAPH 4: NUMBER OF BUSINESS FAILURES PER 10,000 EXISTING BUSINESSES

reports that two sociologists who did research on the effects of unemployment, Paul Lazarsfeld and E. Wight Bakke, found that the individual characteristics of the unemployed person had little effect on his reactions. Intelligence, nationality, and work experience did not determine reactions to joblessness.[6]

However, one must note that despite physical and mental suffering brought about by prolonged joblessness, there is little evidence that the depression seriously worsened the long term physical health of society. Life expectancy continued to rise during this period, as the death rate continued to fall. People generally had enough food, though its nutritional balance was poor. There was a lack of clothing, poor housing, and more vagrancy as people took to the road to look for jobs.[7] In this paper, however, I am investigating the short and long term psychological effects of economic deprivation.

One way to view the events of the thirties is to focus on the fact that conditions were worse than they had been in the twenties. Concomitantly, one can view the thirties in a less relativistic way: conditions weren't as bad as they could get. Along these lines, Garraty comments that because the cost of living fell further and faster than wages fell, those who were fully employed during the depression were economically better off than they had been before 1929.[8] Even though the thirties was an era of mass unemployment, there were more employed than unemployed at all times during the depression. True, there were more unemployed than ever before, but they were always a minority.

A. PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF UPHEAVAL

One of the ways that a depression affects people is the changes it brings about in attitudes and actions. The upheaval of 1929 and the early thirties in the economic sphere caused upheaval in other aspects of life as well. For example, in any depression the family -- a unit dedicated to its own survival -- can act in different ways. Imagine a family in which the breadwinner is jobless, savings are nearly gone, and few job prospects are in sight. Depending on the family's dynamics, family members may decide not to take risky economic ventures -- spending that last dollar on a lottery ticket, spending money on gas to travel to look for work -- and therefore miss opportunities for their own recovery. On the other hand, the burden of having a family to support may spur the breadwinner to find such opportunities, to search diligently for a job. If either pattern becomes widespread, the prospects for national economic recovery will be affected. In either case, relationships and assumptions are changed within the family by the economic situation.

As another example, attitudes about 'winners' and 'losers' in a depression can change. The rich can become sympathetic philanthropists or moralize about sinners and saints: the victims are paying for their economic sins, while, as Frederick Lewis Allen puts it, "tough, hard-working, efficient types would survive; ultimately, virtue would be rewarded."[9]

In her history of the public relief system, Josephine Brown traces the change in attitudes about the culpability of the

unemployed, which is corroborated by Bakke, in The Unemployed Worker. For the first several years (1929-1932) the public opinion of relief recipients was that they were incompetent, paupers, and slackers, although by the end of 1932 agencies began to distinguish between the employable and the unemployable. In 1933 there was so much unemployment that the unemployed began to make up a cross section of the society, but recipients were still not fully approved. 1934 saw the beginning of federal responsibility for relief, which helped to foster the idea that the unemployed were no different than the employed ("There, but for the grace of God..."). With federal programs working at full tilt in 1935, the unemployed enjoyed an improved status -- they were performing useful work and earning money. This year probably marked the high point both in self respect and in public sympathy for the unemployed, for with the increasing number of jobs available in industry, the popular belief that those on public relief were undeserving began to renew itself.[10] The thirties also witnessed at least a partial shift from the belief that local communities should take care of their own to the feeling that the federal government should shoulder the burden of relief for those within its borders.[11]

The depression was a period of movement. Many people were willing to change their way of life -- to move, to change industries -- in order to survive. The psychological impact of the upheaval must have been great to bring about such enormous surges of occupational and physical motion. While 'Okies' travelled to California to escape dust storms and infertile land and to look for jobs in the land of milk and honey, Southern

blacks and appalachian whites continued to move to northern cities. While some tried to persuade people to leave the 'overcrowded cities' and to go back to the soil, many more people moved into cities. Some northern social workers tried to persuade blacks to return to the South, where food and clothing would be more readily attainable, but few heeded such advice. In his studies of subregional migration for the period 1935-1940, Donald Bogue comes to the conclusion that most of the migration of those years was from one urban area to another and that there was a comparative dearth of rural to urban migration.[12]

George Pierson posits both physical and social mobility as essential ingredients to American life. He says that perhaps the despair of the 1930s was due to the halting of upward mobility; for the Okie and the factory hand alike, there was no place to go -- movement did not bring upward social mobility, as it had done before.[13] Stephan Thernstrom, in The Other Bostonians modifies this view, holding that while upward mobility did not halt entirely during the depression, fewer workers than formerly moved upward and more people in low white-collar positions found themselves unable to hold on to their jobs.[14] In other words, the depression made it hard, but not impossible, to move upwards in the social and occupational structure.

B. PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF UNEMPLOYMENT

Unemployment was even more unsettling than the confusion in the economic sphere. At one time, over one quarter of the civilian labor force was unemployed. Before the crash, in Helen and Robert Lynd's Middletown (Muncie, Indiana), the reaction to

unemployment on the part of the unemployed was to get another job -- taking a cut in pay or changing industries, if need be.[15] Unemployment was seen as both natural and regrettable, but not permanent or unduly upsetting unless it persisted for quite some time.

Most writers agree that work gives the worker a sense of identity; when the work is lost, so is that identity. Losing a job and home means, for many, losing their function.[16] Bakke found that the skilled workers and all but a very few of the laborers he studied shared the attitude of feeling lost without the work to which they were accustomed.[17] An economist comments that "common among the psychic costs of unemployment is a sense of being condemned to uselessness in a world that worships the useful."[18]

This loss of identity was often accompanied by a certain amount of self-blame. Perhaps one reason for self-blame was that there are few other plausible explanations for the termination of employment. There was very little class consciousness in the U.S., and it was obvious to most people that the Almighty had little to do with holding down a job. If losing or keeping a job could not be pinned on heavenly disposition or on class oppression, people often turned to themselves as the source of their troubles. Bakke describes a man out of work, who after eight weeks, "began to wonder 'what is wrong with me?'"[19]

Unemployment brought about changes in nearly all aspects of life. The loss of a job changed careers, plans, confidence, even family relationships. In fact, it was rare if a facet of life was not changed. Bakke found that men with families suffered

blows to their self-confidence when they found that the traditional head of the family was not able to perform his normal function. He was failing to support his own family, something he'd had every expectation that he would be able to do. The blow was all the harder when self-blame was limited: perhaps the failure was not all his own fault. He would be able to support his family if he had a chance to work.[20]

There were other ramifications to losing a job than the blow to the unemployed person's confidence. Not only did loss of a job mean less fraternizing with co-workers on the job, the reduced income dictated less sharing in group activities -- even if there was enough money for an occasional beer at the bar, there was not enough to treat friends or take part in other activities. In turn, this caused the unemployed person to feel even more alone and cut off.[21]

Both Lazarsfeld's and Bakke's studies found a distinct pattern in the lives of unemployed workers. At first, when people lost their jobs, they responded by searching energetically for new ones. If no jobs turned up, they gradually became discouraged, perhaps even emotionally distraught. After some lengthy amount of time unemployed, they either sank into apathy or adjusted to doing nothing. In either case, they led extremely limited existences in apparent calm.[22] But underneath the calm there lurked a growing social alienation. In fact, Bakke even detected a more favorable attitude than previously among the unemployed and very low paid workers towards those who broke the law in desperation, to put food in family members' mouths.[23]

C. CONCLUSION

I will examine these reactions to upheaval and unemployment in further detail, but here it is important to understand that unemployment and the depression had effects on the society as a whole and on the great majority of those then living, unemployed or not. In response to pervasive hard times, a new literature and changes in the existing genres developed during this period, and these are the subjects next examined.

CHAPTER 1: ENDNOTES

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LITERATURE OF THE DEPRESSION

> Charles and Ladonna Stanley comment on hardship within the family.
>
> "My mother has died," says Ladonna, "my aunt was found dead, Uncle Lawrence just died, Charles' brother was badly hurt in a wreck, and our daughter's father-in-law seriously injured his hand in an industrial accident."
>
> "And," says Charles, "we got an old cat over home that don't look too good either..."[1]

The depression didn't seem to sink in quickly. Most executive jobs were intact and the well-to-do weren't gravely disturbed. Although many of them had been hurt in the Panic, they tried to laugh off their losses.[2] People weren't overly afraid, because they didn't know what was coming. By 1931, however, attitudes began to change. The 'downturn phase of the business cycle' was persisting long after it should have corrected itself. Disillusionment and bewilderment set in.[3]

Disillusionment, bewilderment, and colossal economic change had huge effects on the society -- its beliefs, mores, and structures. One of the best indices of such social change is found in the literature produced during the depression. New genres and emphases are found in depression literature. Some writers concentrated on effects of the depression on ordinary people. Other writers discussed the effects of the depression on intellectuals and writers themselves.

Among the effects of the depression on writers can be counted the new movement to join the Communist Party. Many writers (though still a relatively small number) did so. Daniel Aaron, author of Writers on the Left, decided that the swelling of Party ranks was brought about by the times and not the Party

itself or the individual writers. Several forces were working on the intellectuals, he holds. First, communism, to some, was a science and an ethic that explained, foretold, and inspired. Second, the Soviet Union, still a young nation, seemed to have no social problems -- it seemed like it was the future, both a reproach to the U.S. and a hope for the world. Finally, the revulsion to Hitler and antifascism in general drove people to the left.[4]

The shocks that inspired some intellectuals to join the Party shook most of the people, to greater or lesser extents. Assumptions upon which Americans depended -- that the American economic system is assured of steady growth; that jobs are a matter of course; that poverty is the result of incompetence or ignorance -- were wrecked.[5] The depression caused both fear -- brought about by insecurity -- and shame -- brought about by going on relief, losing status, and self-blame.

Warren Susman holds that these emotions caused the widespread popularity of comedy and other forms stressing rules. In comedy, rules are broken and chaos reigns for a short, sweet moment. By the end of the film, book, or radio show episode, however, the social order is firmly reentrenched and everyone lives happily ever after. Susman also argues that the fascination with order and rules led many to join groups, factions, or parties -- like Upton Sinclair's 'Epic,' Huey Long's 'Share Our Wealth,' or the Townsend Plan -- that proposed basic new rules for reorganizing society. People were searching for a cause to which they could commit themselves; something that would

sweep them up and deliver them a new world. Frederick Lewis Allen remarked that underneath the arguments and ardor for differing causes, there remained gnawing doubts. Things were changing so fast that it seemed unlikely that any social creed would provide sure solutions. Allen's prose captures well the bewilderment that must have been felt by those who did not join a movement or two:

> "While the social salvationists marched in earnest procession toward their various goals of revolution or reforms, these others stood silent and bewildered by the roadside. Something had gone wrong with the country but they didn't know what, couldn't figure it out, wondered if anybody could figure it out."[7]

A. DEPRESSION STYLES

The depression created the atmosphere and experiences necessary for the acceptance of new literary forms. The popular genres of the 1930s included historical fiction, documentary literature, proletarian novels, inspirational books on how to be a better person, and 'tough guy' books.[8] Leo Gurko, author of The Angry Decade, decided that the emergence of these forms or their popularity was due to many factors, most springing from the economic depression. Historical novels, he writes, helped to shore up confidence and stimulate faith at a time when the confidence of the country in itself was being shaken by misfortune. A sense of crisis at home and abroad helped to promote the popularity of historical fiction. To face the danger, people turned to the past, and the return to former glories reaffirmed America's capacity to outride present dangers. The historical novel -- of which examples are Margaret Mitchell's Gone With the Wind (1936), Bruce Lancaster's The Guns of Burgoyne

(1939), or Stark Young's So Red the Rose (1934) -- played a part in the resurgence of the national spirit during the years immediately prior to the Second World War.[9]

Documentary literature showed the new social consciousness. In such works as Let Us Now Praise Famous Men, Erskine Caldwell and Margaret Bourke-White's You Have Seen Their Faces, and Say, Isn't This the USA, Archibald MacLeish's Land of the Free, and Dorothea Lange and Paul S. Taylor's An American Exodus, photos and words were interchangeable. Together, word and photos produce a momentary shock.[10] Nowhere is this technique more effective than in Dorothea Lange's photos and books. The shock produced is a shock of recognition -- 'these are people like us' -- and horror -- 'are people really living in such awful conditions in this country?' In a way, the documentary literature represented an attempt to get people involved, interested in changing such conditions.

The hard-boiled writing used in the tough guy style also tried to tear at the readers' apathy. The tough literature is a reflection of the times -- in such works as Raymond Chandler's The Big Sleep (1939), Dashiell Hammett's The Maltese Falcon (1930), and Ernest Hemingway's To Have and to Have Not (1937), the reader is presented with a corrupt world, cosmic indifference, and intense individualism. The heroes are loners, protecting themselves from the evils of the world as well as from any involvement -- emotional or otherwise -- with other characters who might, after being allowed near the hero's well-hidden inner core of tenderness and humanity, destroy him with their knowledge of his vulnerability.[11] The tough quality is

dictated by the social milieu, claims David Madden, author of Tough Guy Writers of the Thirties. In the depression, not only were norms disrupted, it seemed as though the gods had capriciously turned their backs on the world of mortals for a decade. Alfred Kazin, writer and critic, adds a wry comment to his analysis of this type of writing: one felt "the reverberation of the struggle of millions in America to survive disaster; and it did not matter that once the point had been made, the readers' apathy destroyed, the moment's urgent release effected, there was nothing left but to go round and round in the same vindictive circle."[12]

The loneliness and social defeat felt by many was also the breeding ground for proletarian literature. In these novels, the characters overcome their fear, loneliness, and friendlessness by banding together. The rousing moral of each of these tales is that isolation is fatal, deadly, and that only by working together can the people triumph. Michael Gold's Jews Without Money (1930) and Jack Conroy's A World to Win (1935) are two of the better known examples of this genre. Madden points out that, for the most part, the workers didn't read proletarian literature, and few workers wrote about other workers. "Is it only intellectuals who love to read about themselves," he asks, "while readers in general are more interested in stereotypical projections of wishful images of themselves? Caught in an economic crisis, did the American worker think of his status as anything but temporary?"[13] By the end of this paper, I hope to be able to answer his final question.

B. STICK 'EM UP or HAIL, FELLOW?

The newly popular genres were one reflection of depression events. New emphases in the literature itself were another. One of the more obvious literary reactions to the depression was the new prominence of violence in the literature. Tom Kromer's Waiting for Nothing is an excellent example of economic deprivation engendering violence. Two short selections from that book give a good idea of the violence the main character contemplates in his search for food or shelter:

> "I walk out. Wouldn't even give a hungry man a cup of coffee. Can you imagine a guy like that? The bastard. I'd like to catch him on a dark street. I'd give him a cup of coffee, and a sock on the snout he wouldn't soon forget."[14]

> "I have made up my mind. Shaky hands or not, I will sleep in no more lousy mission flops. I have whined for my last meal. I have the gat [gun] and I am going to use it if I have to. No one cares whether I live or die.... To hell with everybody. I am going to get mine."[15]

Some of the most popular movies, too, of that era were gangster films whose main attraction seemed to be flowing blood. Stuart Kaminsky, author of American Film Genres, holds that gangster films were semi-conscious attempts to deal with the public's shaken confidence in American politics, economics, and myths of the self-made man.[16] Examples of the gangster films of the era are Little Caesar (1930), Public Enemy (1931), Scarface (1932), and Angels with Dirty Faces (1938), all films in which the life of an Italian-American, Irish-American, or rural American fights his way to the top, glories in the gangster's version of conspicuous consumption, and is punished, usually by death, for his misdeeds.

On the other hand, the depression seemed to inculcate a feeling of camaraderie, also expressed in the writing of the period. Related to the proletarian writers' discovery that isolation is fatal, togetherness a lifeline, is the further development of the concept of unity -- everyone was in the same boat, and could help one another.

In the real world of depression politics, Franklin Roosevelt's first important act as president in 1933 helped to dramatize this concept of national unity. The day after his inauguration, Roosevelt declared a national bank holiday, which, contrary to what might be expected, was not greeted with horror. Allen recalls, in his book Since Yesterday, that even though the bank holiday brought new distress, a curtailment of business, more layoffs, and hurt those already hard-hit, most Americans felt better -- felt a sense of relief -- about their financial woes once the veil of secrecy was lifted. Now everyone seemed to be on the same level -- both a millionaire and a pauper could be caught with only five dollars in his pocket -- and there was no shame in being short of money. People reacted to the holiday good-naturedly.[17] At the beginning of the New Deal, the people were captivated and persuaded by President Roosevelt. He gave them action, and it seemed that confidence could be restored.[18]

Warren Susman has called the culture of the thirties the 'culture of commitment.' The depression did not inspire a turn to religion, as would, perhaps, a natural disaster. Instead, it inspired social-minded commitment.[19] Evidence of such commitment can be seen in the numbers who joined the Communist Party, the numbers who fought in Spain. Josephine Brown, historian of the

public relief system, found commitment, loyalty, and integrity among the staff of local and state relief offices. They worked ceaselessly, under exhausting pressures, for moderate and sometimes pathetically inadequate pay. Despite the pressures, responsibilities, and undertrained personnel, staff morale at federal, state, and local levels was remarkably high.

Perhaps the best examples of depression-produced camaraderie can be found in John Steinbeck's The Grapes of Wrath:

> "The stout woman smiled. 'No need to thank. Ever'body's in the same wagon. S'pose we was down. You'd a give us a han'.'
> 'Yes,' Ma said, 'we would.'
> 'Or anybody.'
> 'Or anybody. Use' ta be the fambly was fust. It ain't so now. It's anybody. Worse off we get, the more we got to do.'"[20]

> "In the evening a strange thing happened: the twenty families became one family, the children were the children of all. The loss of home became one loss, and the golden time in the West was one dream. And it might be that a sick child threw despair into the hearts of twenty families, of a hundred people; that a birth there in a tent kept a hundred people quiet and awestruck through the night and filled a hundred people with the birth-joy in the morning. A family which the night before had been lost and fearful might search its goods to find a present for a new baby. In the evening, sitting about the fires, the twenty were one."[21]

C. CONCLUSION

The depression, then, fostered violence, hardship, anger, fellowship, and camaraderie. Were these only literary imaginings, or did they have a basis in reality? One way to answer this question is to study the indices of violence and despair during the period. Is there more or less than would be expected? Are there any important deviations in patterns due to economic deprivation? Is upheaval itself enough to cause

violence, or does there necessarily have to be certain types of deprivation? In the next sections, I will examine suicide and homicide during the depression and use that data to answer the questions above.

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UNEMPLOYMENT, SUICIDE, AND THE DEPRESSION

> "The eyes of these women you will see in a soup-line are something to look at. They are deep eyes. They are sunk in deep hollows. The hollows are rimmed with black. Their brows are wrinkled and lined from worry. They are stoop-shouldered and flat-chested. They have a look on their face. I have seen that look on the faces of dogs when they have been whipped with a stick."[1]

Books and movies are good testimonials to the impact of the depression. Another way of investigating that impact is to examine those people who took their own lives during the depression. Of course, each suicide is unique, and not all can be said to be due to the depression. It is safe to say, however, that many of them must be due at least in part to events of the depression.

In investigating the suicide rates during the four decades spanning 1900 to 1940, I have found that the suicide rate is closely connected with the unemployment rate. That is, the changes in the percentage unemployed are most closely correlated to the changes in the suicide rate, more than the other determining variables I chose: wages; lagged wages, which are wages of the year before; lagged unemployment rates, which are unemployment rates of the year before; and bond ratings. I chose bond ratings, which are essentially businessmen's predictions about the state of the economy in the coming months, to see if this was an accurate perception -- if these people had their fingers on the pulse of the economy of the nation. For a fuller explanation, please see the Appendix. My findings were confirmed by M. Harvey Brenner's "Estimating the Social Costs of National Economic Policy," a more sophisticated study in which the

determining variables were the change in the employment rate, inflation, and per capita income (wages).[2] He found, as I did, that the unemployment rate was the most stable and predictable factor influencing the suicide rate.[3]

These discoveries point to several possible hypotheses. One, for example, is that the depression induced suicide among the unemployed. Alternatively, the suicides might not have been the unemployed themselves, but others affected by the unemployment rate. Third, the amount of their wages wasn't nearly as important to people as was the regularity of the paycheck. Fourth, there is no lag time between unemployment and suicide: whether or not one chooses to take one's life depends on one's immediate circumstances, not on what happened some time previously. Fifth, analysts predicting values for bonds had little to no clue to how people actually felt, if the suicide rate is accepted as a valid indicator of those feelings.

The hypotheses above are merely that -- hypotheses. They are <u>not</u> conclusions, as they are based on a tiny nugget of information. Principally I am concerned with the first and second hypotheses here. Unemployment rates are an indicator about one facet of society. Suicide rates are another. My investigation has shown that they are linked, but it has not illuminated the link itself. I am reluctant to claim a causal relationship between unemployment and suicide, even though the regression analysis would allow one to do so. On the cautionary side, I must point out that unemployment and suicide merely vary together -- there could be something unseen and unsuspected as

proximate cause to them both. Also, the unemployed were a changing mass of people, not a fixed group. On the other side are the points that, first, the statistical tests would allow one to claim that it was the unemployed who committed suicide; second, other historians would probably make the claim; and third, unemployment is now seen as a cause of quite a lot of pathological behavior.

Who committed suicide during the depression? The unemployed, or others? Perhaps investigation into the two groups -- the unemployed and the suicides -- will cast a light on the link not made visible by merely mathematical tools. In this analysis, I hope to answer questions about the effect of the depression on the unemployed and the employed and to use this information in conjunction with information about the suicides of the depression.

A. THE UNEMPLOYED

1. Who were the unemployed?

To gain a composite picture of the unemployed during the depression, one must remember that unemployment took as its victims people of all races and ages. Nevertheless, there were distinguishable characteristics of the unemployed as a group. Since there is only sketchy information on the unemployed, I have turned to relief information to study their characteristics. First: the average age of men on relief rolls was 38, and the average age of women on relief was 33.[4] Men outnumbered women three to one. About three quarters of the people on relief were white, the other fourth being made up of both blacks and other races.[5] In their study Urban Workers on Relief, Gladys Palmer

and Katherine Wood classified about two thirds of the families whose members were on relief as being 'normal,' while the other third was made up of broken families and single people.[6] Palmer and Wood's study also detailed the job distribution among those on relief:

34% - unskilled
25% - semiskilled
25% - skilled
16% - professional/clerical[7]

The ten occupations reported on relief rolls as hardest hit for both men and women were (not in any order):

1. Servants
2. Chauffeurs, truck and tractor drivers
3. Laborers (building and general)
4. Salesmen
5. Carpenters
6. Painters
7. Clerks
8. Operatives in iron and steel industries
9. Operatives in the clothing industry
10. Coal miners.[8]

It seems, then, that these occupations' job contraction must have disproportionately harmed the poor and the unskilled.[9] The unskilled were on relief in greater numbers than the semiskilled or skilled; the average man on relief hadn't finished elementary school education, although the average woman had.[10] The men in Palmer and Wood's study had had at least ten years experience in their chosen occupation, the women had not.[11]

Palmer and Wood note that there were likely to be differences between unemployed people on relief and the non-relief unemployed. The jobless on relief were older than those that were not; those on relief were probably out of work longer than those not; those on relief were probably more unskilled than

those not. In addition, there was a higher relative proportion of blacks and people of foreign birth on relief.[12] They conclude in their report that the unemployed, as a group and especially those on relief, are not industrial misfits, or those who had never done a day's labor. Instead, they were hard working, relatively experienced in their chosen jobs, and had relatively regular working patterns.[13]

2. What were the effects of unemployment?

These basics in mind, we can investigate the impact of unemployment. Could unemployment have led to suicide? As noted in Chapter One, unemployment was not unique to the depression, as the unemployment rate had been rising since 1926. In his study of New Haven, Connecticut, E. Wight Bakke found that most of the unemployed workers had known major spells of unemployment before the depression. Work, on the whole, was rather irregular.[14] Michael Katz, in his recent book <u>In the Shadow of the Poorhouse</u>, points out, as have I, that the depression did not create unemployment, but that the depression radically magnified its scale and intensified the irregularity of work.[15]

In his study of the unemployed on relief in New Haven, Bakke argued that the worker has three basic goals at any given time: first, to play a socially respected role in society; second, to obtain a measure of economic security; and third, to have control over one's own affairs.[16] He found that unemployment did not destroy these goals, but forced the worker to modify them. With the loss of the symbols of respectability, one must temper the ambition to play a socially respected role. Even with relief, economic security was minimal. Some workers adopted new ways to

control their lives by devising ruses to make the relief system pay. If obtaining relief depended on making oneself seem completely helpless, then some 'talked poor mouth.'[17] Others sold unneeded materials, such as blankets, they got on relief, which was against all rules. Some persuaded insurance companies to help them convince relief agencies that their policy had lapsed so that the client could keep the policy and get relief, too.[18]

Adjustment to debt -- for most unemployed did go heavily into debt, according to Bakke -- made people cut down on expenses, but the plane of living didn't fluctuate violently. People economized on clothes, recreation, food, and insurance. They moved to less expensive housing or moved in with relatives.[19] When cutting down on recreation, they went to fewer movies or clubs, went on fewer visits, saw fewer live sports events, and substituted cheaper ways of killing time -- they went to amateur sports events, attended court, went for walks, or stayed at home.[20]

Was it painful to go or be on relief? I traced, in the first section, the ups and downs of the reputation of relief -- when it was more or less acceptable to go on relief. Whitecollar and professional workers had a hard time on relief, because the customary relief budget allowances were scaled not to <u>their</u> normal incomes, but to those of factory hands. Consequently, they made a relatively greater sacrifice. They faced a greater humiliation than laborers in doing without clothes, a car, newspapers, a telephone, and all the other accoutrements of

middle class life.[21] In addition, the cultural stigma of accepting charity -- as they saw it -- was psychologically wearing and rasped against the grain of middle-class respectability that they cherished.

It was not easy, emotionally, for anyone to go on relief, but the factory hand or the day laborer reportedly found it less painful to go on relief if their friends and neighbors were in the same circumstances. They could shift some of the responsibility for their reduced status from their own shoulders as they came in contact with others in the same position: if there were so many -- and there were millions -- in the same circumstances it was hard to see how they could all be individually to blame. Contact with other people on relief increased as a family moved to cheaper and cheaper rents, and the blow to prestige was softened somewhat by having companions in distress.[22]

Did unemployment merely disrupt lives and create unexpected and excessive stress, or did it whip people unmercifully? The record shows both sides of the story. The spring of 1933 may have marked the nadir of the depression, as far as it can be measured. Fifteen million people were out of work. Public services were suspended. People were losing their homes and farms. There was no such thing as security, according to Josephine Brown, "whether that meant the assurance of a job, a home, a farm, shares of stock, deposits in banks, or a life insurance policy."[23]

M. Harvey Brenner, author of "Influence of the Social Environment on Psychopathology" points out that all abrupt economic changes -- whether they be on the scale of the depression or not -- and regardless of their direction, are stress provoking. Undesirable changes, he finds, exemplified by unemployment or income loss, are substantially more generative of stress, tension, and other pathological conditions. As if that weren't enough, the undesirable events -- inherently stressful as they are -- have further implications beyond the initial event.[24] Even during a depression, unemployment is often seen as merely a short term disruption to the family, finances, social network, and work. In the long term, unemployment involves downward social mobility, as those who are rehired are often underemployed (their skills are not used to full capacity), which is in itself stress provoking.[25] The stress associated with unemployment and relief is hardly measurable, but at least one current economist has arrived at figures concerning present day unemployment: with every one percent increase in the U.S. unemployment rate, 920 more people commit suicide, 650 commit homicide, 500 die from heart and kidney disease, 4,000 are admitted to state mental hospitals, 3,300 are sent to state prisons. A one percent increase means 37,000 more deaths, including 20,000 heart attacks.[26]

Unemployment is stressful. So is going on relief. Even those on relief or involved in a New Deal work program were not spared tensions and uncertainties. They worried about creditors taking their earnings. The relief jobs weren't plentiful and workers didn't know how long their jobs would last.[27] Political

pressures on President Roosevelt and the New Dealers meant that numbers on relief rolls fluctuated and appropriations for projects varied widely. The general uncertainty tended to dampen morale of those working on the projects.[28]

Even though relief brought a measure of economic security, Bakke found unemployed people joyless. The relief eased the physical hardship, but it was not true medicine for the mental attitudes of the ambitious, be they lower, middle, or upper class.[29] He found that economic security is different than holding a job -- those on direct relief had no control over their own affairs, one of the things he regards as essential to the workers' mental health.[30] This loss of control caused great distress.

Did they give up, these people of the depression? Some say yes, some say no. Roy Rosenzweig, labor and cultural historian, thinks not. He has traced the history of the 'unemployment movement' during the depression and states that the absence of a revolution doesn't mean that the unemployed meekly accepted their lot.[31] The unemployed employed spontaneous survival strategies -- starting cooperative movements, starting neighborhood assistance networks, looting supermarkets, etc. -- and some joined councils associated with the Communist Party, the Socialist Party, and others. The groups managed to stop some evictions, turn on the gas and electricity, or raise relief payments.[32] The organizations of the unemployed were not revolutionary, nor were they truly a mass movement; the core membership of the groups never included even one percent of the

unemployed.[33] Perhaps people joined these groups as a response to the widely felt need for commitment and adherence to rules. Rosenzweig says that, through the movements, "jobless workers became convinced that their condition was not their own fault, that larger economic forces had thrown them out of work."[34] Robert McElvaine, in the introduction to his book of letters to the Roosevelts, says that, as the depression wore on, self-blame declined and people began to feel that the government 'owed' them relief.[35]

On the other side of the coin are those scholars and observers who felt that unemployment and the depression whipped their victims, that those who fell would never rise again. Harry Hopkins, in an effort to find out how the New Deal programs were being received and how well they were working, sent Lorena Hickok traveling all over the country to observe and to report to him. At the outset, in 1933, she believed that the unemployed were not taking things sitting down, and she felt that riots would not be long in coming.[36] But by January, 1935, she said that she saw a whole generation -- those made unemployable by the depression -- stranded. Men over forty with half-grown families, who were bad insurance risks, who were being crowded by a younger generation, who couldn't keep up the pace demanded by their work, sustained a sort of bitter apathy.[37] She also worried about the young between the ages of 17 and 20 who had no work experience and had no chance of getting any. Soon, they too would be crowded by those who were younger still. This group she saw as a lost generation.[38] In <u>The Unemployed Worker</u>, Bakke comes to the conclusion that a chief source of difficulty in finding

employment was that people knew they were looking for jobs that weren't there. They felt they were taking part in a sort of tragic play-acting; they were whipped before they started.[39]

B. THE EMPLOYED

I noted above that one alternative to the hypothesis that the unemployed were responsible for the increase in the suicide rates was that it was not they, but others equally disturbed by the state of the economy who committed suicide. Is this position really defensible?

Those still employed were not safe either from the disturbances of the depression. John Garraty points out that the change in the economic climate must have been unsettling, even to those who continued to work steadily after 1929. The social and economic mobility of the previous decade came to a sudden halt. "Few workers," he says, "could feel safe when ever-larger numbers of their colleagues were out of work, and no end to the hard times was in sight."[40]

Reduced income caused people to share less often in group activities. This holds true for unemployed and employed alike, as wages fell and businesses failed. The lessened contact with friends and relatives made, in some cases, the individual feel alone and cut off.[41] Of course, in other cases, individuals felt a sense of camaraderie with others hit by the depression.

In other words, many of the elements that caused distress to the unemployed were also features in the lives of the employed -- loss of control, reduced income, and uncertainty about keeping a job. It appears, then, that one of the things that happened to

employed and unemployed alike was the reduction of income, which in turn tended to cut people off from their usual activities and from each other. Emile Durkheim, sociologist, originated a term for this state of isolation: anomie. Anomie, he explains, is an important factor in many suicides. Could the isolation induced by the reduction of income be responsible for the rise in the suicide rate during the depression? If it is, then the rise in the suicide rate cannot be due merely to the large numbers of unemployed. If, however, not isolation and privation alone, but feelings of uselessness, privation, and isolation together are necessary to produce anomie, then the link between the suicide rate and the unemployment rate has been partially illuminated. The unemployed faced greater emotional changes and deprivation than did the employed and consequently became in many cases more alone and cut off than did the employed. One of the reasons that I am reluctant to claim direct causation between unemployment and suicide is that it is only unemployment that separates the employed from the unemployed. Many of the same things were experienced by both the employed and the unemployed. Maybe it is just unemployment that makes the difference.

SUICIDE

Suicide is a difficult topic to deal with exhaustively. I indicated above that I thought suicide rates could be useful indicators about the state of a society -- about the general optimism or pessimism felt by those living through a crisis. In literature, at least, both optimism and pessimism were adequately expressed: were they reflected in suicide rates during the depression? To examine this subject thoroughly, one must first

understand the normal societal patterns of suicide and then venture on to depression patterns to see if and how the patterns changed as a result of the crisis.

A. NORMAL PATTERNS

Over the years, researchers dealing with the topic of suicide have recorded several general patterns of suicide. These patterns take into account who commits suicide and when they commit suicide; they have also theorized as to why people end their lives. The first and foremost of these scholars is indubitably Émile Durkheim, who published his Le Suicide in 1897. Durkheim (1858-1917) established the foundations of modern sociology. He turned it into the study of the group that influences the individual, rejecting the stance of his forerunners, who concentrated on the study of the individual in the group. He combined empirical research in France with sociological theory. Most subsequent scholars seem to use his work as a base point and either support or refute his positions. As far as possible, I have tried to decide between their arguments by doing my own analysis of the U.S. Bureau of the Census' Mortality Statistics, published yearly from 1900 to 1936, and the Bureau of the Census' Vital Statistics of the United States for 1937 to 1940.

The very basics of suicide are questions of demographics: which sex committed suicide more often, at what age, at what time of year, which race committed suicide more often, and was the place of residence urban or rural. Beyond these questions, one can investigate more intangible attributes -- marital status,

religion, occupation, and so on. In this section, I will deal with these questions in the order just specified and go on to discuss depression patterns.

1. Gender

Durkheim noted that men were more likely to commit suicide than women were. The reason for the disparity, he said, was that women were creatures of rudimentary sensibilities and were less attached to society (societal influence being all important to suicide, according to Durkheim), while men were more complex social beings and needed more support from others around them.[42] He also said that women were less educated and were fundamentally traditionalist by nature, hence they hold fixed beliefs and have no great intellectual needs, denial of which could have been an impetus to suicide.[43] Ruth Cavan, who studied case histories and combined her observations with statistical work, also noted the difference but postulated that either more men than women are subjected to critical situations or men are less able to adjust to them.[44] My study of the years from 1900 to 1940 bears out their observations that at every age, men are more likely to commit suicide than women. (See Table 1) Cumulatively, 22.2% of all suicide was female; for every 78 male suicides, there were 22 female -- nearly a ratio of 1 to 4.

2. Age

At what age are people most likely to commit suicide? Durkheim decided that children and the elderly demand less from society and that therefore they feel no lack of anything that could lead them to commit suicide.[45] Few succeeding authors have taken up the subject of age, but I have found that, for 1900-

Table 1: Distribution of suicide by sex and age 1900-1940

	Ages:	0-5	5-9	10-14	15-19	20-24	25-29
Totals	M sum	0	27	975	7538	21589	27752
	*Percent	.00	84.38	64.83	50.69	63.86	68.41
	F sum	0	5	529	7334	12219	12814
	*Percent	.00	15.63	35.17	49.31	36.14	31.59
	sum	0	32	1504	14872	33808	40566

30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49	50-54	55-59	60-64	65-69
31452	37036	39621	42985	58472	38386	32798	25353
71.91	75.19	77.70	79.41	85.62	82.98	83.98	84.98
12284	12221	11371	11145	9819	7871	6257	4482
28.09	24.81	22.30	20.59	14.38	17.02	16.02	15.02
43736	49257	50992	54130	68291	46257	39055	29835

70-74	75-79	80-84	85-89	90-94	95-99	100+	unknown
17191	10402	4842	1612	297	51	8	1197
86.26	87.52	87.73	87.23	82.50	75.00	80.00	89.93
2739	1483	677	236	63	17	2	134
13.74	12.48	12.27	12.77	17.50	25.00	20.00	10.07
19930	11885	5519	1848	360	68	10	1331

* Percent means percent of all suicides in male or female age group

Average percentage of female suicides for any one age group 21.42

Average percentage of male suicides for any one age group 78.58

1940, no children less than five years old committed suicide, while one or two a year did so in the five to nine age group. Overall, people committed suicide most within the ages of fifty to fifty-four -- 13.3% of all suicides occurred between those ages; 43.4% between 35 and 54. Clearly, middle age is the dominant period for suicide. (See Table 2 and graphs 5, 6, 7, and 8) Within any single age group, men always committed more suicides, but for the age group 15-19, women committed nearly half of the suicides. However, of all female suicides that occurred, most fell between the ages 20 and 39, with the dominant age group being 20-25. Women committed suicide at substantially younger ages than did the population as a whole.

Of all male suicides, men committed suicide predominantly between 50 and 54, determining, by weight of their larger numbers, the trends in the population as a whole. One quarter of all male suicides between 1900 and 1940 occurred in the age group 45-54, and 44.9% between the ages 40 and 59. The conclusions to be drawn here are that women committed suicide at an earlier point in their lives than did men, since the principal age group for women was 20 to 29, while the men's was 40 to 59. As a result of the greater proportion of male suicides, the statistics for the men dominate, causing the total dominant ages to be between 40 and 59. (See Graph 8)

3. Race

Durkheim distinguishes between races in turn-of-the century France -- Germans, Slavs, Latins, Anglo-Saxons, and so on. He comes to the conclusion that race is not as influential as is the

Table 2: Distribution of suicide by sex and age 1900-1940

	Ages:	0-4	5-9	10-14	15-19	20-24	25-29
Totals	M sum	0	27	975	7538	21589	27752
	*Percent	.00	.01	.24	1.89	5.40	6.95
	F sum	0	5	529	7334	12219	12814
	*Percent	.00	.00	.47	6.45	10.75	11.27
	sum	0	32	1504	14872	33808	40566
	*Percent	.00	.01	.29	2.90	6.59	7.90

30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49	50-54	55-59	60-64	65-69
31452	37036	39621	42985	58472	38386	32798	25353
7.87	9.27	9.92	10.76	14.63	9.61	8.21	6.34
12284	12221	11371	11145	9819	7871	6257	4482
10.80	10.75	10.00	9.80	8.64	6.92	5.50	3.94
43736	49257	50992	54130	68291	46257	39055	29835
8.52	9.60	9.93	10.55	13.30	9.01	7.61	5.81

70-74	75-79	80-84	85-89	90-94	95-99	100+	unknown
17191	10402	4842	1612	297	51	8	1197
4.30	2.60	1.21	.40	.07	.01	.00	.30
2739	1483	677	236	63	17	2	134
2.41	1.30	.60	.21	.06	.01	.00	.12
19930	11885	5519	1848	360	68	10	1331
3.88	2.32	1.08	.36	.07	.01	.00	.26

* Percent means percent of all male or female suicides that occur within this age group

43.4 percent of all suicides occur between 35 and 54

44.9 percent of all male suicides occur between 40 and 59

43.6 percent of all female suicides occur between 20 and 39

30

20 Squares to the Inch

NATIONAL 12-282

GRAPH 5: PERCENTAGE OF ALL SUICIDE LIFETIMES [illegible] 1900-1940

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GRAPH 6: PERCENTAGE OF MALE SUICIDES BY AGE GROUP 1900-1990



GRAPH 7: PERCENTAGE OF FEMALE SUICIDE BY AGE GROUP [illegible]



GRAPH 8: PERCENTAGE OF SUICIDES BY AGE GROUP - COMPARISON 1900-1940



civilization in which one is reared.[46] He does not investigate caucasian versus non-caucasian suicides, and I cannot compare my results to his, as the Mortality Statistics only distinguishes between whites and non-whites. Ruth Cavan agrees with him, holding that suicide is not due to racial temperament, at least in Europe. She does not investigate whites/non-whites to any great extent.[47]

From 1923 to 1940 -- the period for which the Bureau of the Census distinguished between races -- non-whites never committed more than eight percent of the suicides for any given age range. The average was about 3.4%. Non-caucasian suicide peaked between the ages of 25 and 29 and was noticeably lower than the total percentage between the ages 50 and 54. Forty-six percent of all white suicides occurred between the ages 40 and 59, while fifty percent of non-white suicides occurred between the ages of 20 and 39 during the same period. (See Tables 3 and 4)

4. Residence

An aspect of suicide patterns that is particularly interesting is the distribution according to place of residence. Durkheim hypothesized that suicide is more urban than rural, because the social causes of suicide are closely related to urban civilization and are found there more often than elsewhere.[48] This relates to his discussion of anomie, which he says is bred easily in an urban atmosphere. Louis Dublin, an epidemiologist whose book Suicide, a sociological and statistical study (1963) was commissioned by the National Institute for Mental Health agrees with Durkheim's distribution of urban and rural suicide, adding that it used to be a rule that the larger the city, the

Table 3: Distribution of white suicide by sex and age 1923-1940

Whites	Ages:	0-5	5-9	10-14	15-19	20-24	25-29
Totals 1923-1940	M sum	0	15	554	4136	10768	13877
	*Percent	.00	.01	.23	1.70	4.43	5.70
	F sum	0	1	238	3379	5834	6606
	*Percent	.00	.00	.36	5.08	8.76	9.92
	sum	0	16	792	7515	16602	20483
	*Percent	.00	.01	.26	2.43	5.36	6.61

30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49	50-54	55-59	60-64	65-69
16244	20104	23317	26098	42119	24421	21324	16869
6.68	8.26	9.58	10.73	17.31	10.04	8.76	6.93
6909	7169	7093	7115	6405	5216	4166	3020
10.38	10.77	10.65	10.69	9.62	7.83	6.26	4.54
23153	27273	30410	33213	48524	29637	25490	19889
7.47	8.80	9.81	10.72	15.66	9.56	8.23	6.42

70-74	75-79	80-84	85-89	90-94	95-99	100+	unknown
11648	6990	3184	1015	171	26	2	425
4.79	2.87	1.31	.42	.07	.01	.00	.17
1810	950	416	143	39	8	1	59
2.72	1.43	.62	.21	.06	.01	.00	.09
13458	7940	3600	1158	210	34	3	484
4.34	2.56	1.16	.37	.07	.01	.00	.16

* Percent means percent of all male or female suicides that occur within this age group

45.75 percent of all suicides occur between 40 and 59

47.66 percent of all male suicides occur between 40 and 59

42.49 percent of all female suicides occur between 30 and 49

Table 4: Distribution of non-white suicide by sex and age 1923-1940

Non-whites	Ages:	0-4	5-9	10-14	15-19	20-24	25-29
Totals 1923-1940	M sum	0	1	40	268	730	934
	*Percent	.00	.01	.53	3.55	9.67	12.37
	F sum	0	0	41	247	480	448
	*Percent	.00	.00	1.60	9.63	18.72	17.47
	sum	0	1	81	515	1210	1382
	*Percent	.00	.01	.80	5.09	11.96	13.66

30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49	50-54	55-59	60-64	65-69
881	982	821	771	675	491	401	233
11.67	13.01	10.87	10.21	8.94	6.50	5.31	3.09
382	266	219	154	114	69	57	37
14.90	10.37	8.54	6.01	4.45	2.69	2.22	1.44
1263	1248	1040	925	789	560	458	270
12.49	12.34	10.28	9.15	7.80	5.54	4.53	2.67

70-74	75-79	80-84	85-89	90-94	95-99	100+	unknown
147	90	35	11	4	0	3	32
1.95	1.19	.46	.15	.05	.00	.04	.42
15	16	9	3	3	1	1	2
.59	.62	.35	.12	.12	.04	.04	.08
162	106	44	14	7	1	4	34
1.60	1.05	.44	.14	.07	.01	.04	.34

* Percent means percent of all male or female suicides that occur within this age group

50.45 percent of all suicides occur between 20 and 39

47.92 percent of all male suicides occurs between 25 and 44

61.47 percent of all female suicides occurs between 20 and 39

higher the suicide rate. But things have changed over time, with a decline in the number of suicides in cities and relatively little change in rural areas.[49] Cavan, however, says that there is no relationship between the size of a city and its suicide rate and further holds that there is no consistent ratio between urban and rural suicides.[50] It is hard to know definitely why suicide varies from city to countryside, though much of the reason probably has to do with the tighter social control of rural areas as opposed to the sort of moral free-for-all popularly supposed to be a hallmark of a city.

The Bureau of the Census distinguished between urban and rural suicides, counting as urban those cities of 10,000 population or more, and rural those places with fewer than 10,000 people. (See Table 5 and Graph 9) Unfortunately, the Bureau of the Census did not keep track of urban and rural populations consistently, which means that I can only give rates for a very few of the thirty-one years they kept records of urban and rural suicides. Since I'd rather deal with as many years as possible, this discussion is based on the raw numbers and not the rates. On average, the rate in urban areas was 12.8 suicides per 1,000 population, while in rural areas it was 11.8, a small but perceptible difference. There were always more suicides in urban than in rural areas, with rural areas contributing 42.5% of all suicides, meaning that for every 43 suicides in rural areas, there were 57 in the cities.

There was also more non-white suicide in urban than in rural areas, as rural non-whites committed only 2.6 percent of all

Table 5: Distribution of urban and rural suicide 1910-1938

		Urban >10,000	Rural <10,000
1910-1938	total	220913	167151
	sum white	213438	162440
	sum non-white	7475	4711

Non-whites committed 3.38 percent of all urban suicides, 2.82 percent of all rural suicides

43 percent of all suicide is rural, 57 percent is urban

GRAPH 9 : URBAN AND RURAL SUICIDES 1900-1938



rural suicides and urban non-whites committed 3.1 percent of all urban suicides. From 1910 to 1938, most suicide was caucasian -- about 96 percent of the urban suicides were committed by whites, 97 percent of the rural suicide were committed by whites. (See Table 5) The conclusions to be drawn here are that, first, there is substantially more urban than rural suicide; and second, most suicide is committed by whites.

The basic demography of suicide, then, was and probably still is, not a large bone of contention. More men than women commit suicide. More whites than other races in the U.S. committed suicide. Overall, people committed suicide most often between the ages 40 and 59. Women were most likely to commit suicide between 20 and 39. Men were more likely to commit suicide between 40 and 59. Non-white suicides peaked between the ages 25 and 39, and show a notable paucity of suicide in the age groups in which whites most often committed suicide. Whites committed most of the suicides, whether they were in urban or rural areas. There was more urban than rural suicide. The graphs and tables perhaps explain this more clearly than I can.

I cannot fully ascribe causes for the differences in suicide rates, but I think I must point out where existing explanations are insufficient. First, more men than women commit suicide. This trend is apparently changing today -- more women are committing suicide than ever before. I don't believe that Durkheim's explanation that women, being cut off from society, have no great intellectual needs denial of which could be conducive to suicide is relevant to the 1900-1940 period in the U.S. Women then were not completely cut off from society, nor

were they then -- or ever -- any less intellectual than men. Cavan's explanation that men are less able to withstand critical situations may have a grain of truth but is not easily reconciled to a history of men's achievements and endurance. Maybe the difference is socially determined, and in a patriarchal, male dominated society, men who lose their power or position feel demeaned and lowered enough in others' eyes to commit suicide, while women -- generally more sensitive than men -- can be strong in the face of adversity because they realize that position and power are not everything. Women with families, especially, feel needed and generally will not leave them voluntarily.

Next, there is the urban and rural difference. I have noted that there is generally just a bit more suicide in urban areas than in rural and that this fits in well with traditional perceptions of cities as places of few morals and little social control. In urban areas, it is believed, one feels alienated, alone: anomic, in fact. In rural areas, so the story goes, there is greater -- suffocating, in some cases -- social control and an extensive support system. Is there any doubt why there is more urban than rural suicide?

Finally, non-whites commit much less suicide than whites. Blacks are the major component of this group, and blacks during this period were more likely to be found living in rural areas than in urban. Blacks, unlike whites, also often have extended families that provide basic economic and emotional security.[51] Finally, one may theorize that blacks were downtrodden during

this period -- depression or no depression. Were they used to losing?

In looking into the demographics of who committed suicide, most researchers also investigate less tangible distributions -- the suicide's status regarding marriage, religion, social milieu, religion, and affluence. Since the Bureau of the Census does not record any of these items, I was left with no way to corroborate or disprove anything others asserted. At this point, I will eschew verbosity and decline to discuss the marital status and religion of suicides, as it does not add appreciably to the information about suicide between 1900 and 1940.

5. Social milieu

The social milieu to which a person belongs is generally recognized to have a large bearing on his suicide. Anomie, one of Durkheim's terms, is the state in which the individual feels very isolated and cut off from others; primary relationships are few and secondary relationships are unsatisfactory. It is Durkheim's contention that anomie is central to most -- but definitely not all -- suicides. I will not examine this point in further detail, because here I am concerned with the basic idea that isolation is a factor in suicide. Louis Dublin agrees with Durkheim, saying that the way the individual deals with a crisis usually depends on the relation of the individual to the world about him -- consequently those who are isolated are more likely to commit suicide than those who are not.[52] George M. Carstairs, in an article entitled "Overcrowding and Human Aggression"

agrees, saying that successful suicides are often found in areas where many people live in social isolation, bereft of any family or other primary support group.[53]

The point that suicide is often due to lack of support or a non-integrated society has come up often in this section. Religion and education have much to do with the integration of society; therefore they should bear some sort of relationship to the occurrence of suicide. Émile Durkheim says that an integrated society provides mutual moral support, and states that suicide varies inversely with the degree of integration of religious, domestic, and political societies.[54] Many scholars have discussed reasons for the different suicide rates among religious groups, and if the reader is interested, there is a short discussion in the chapter notes.[55] As religion is not very germane to the issue at hand, it is dispensed with here.

6. Affluence

One of the central points of disagreement among suicide scholars is that of wealth versus poverty. One faction -- Durkheim, Henry, and Short, among others -- holds that suicide is particularly prevalent among the wealthy, or high status groups.[56] It is one of Durkheim's central tenets that suicidal behavior is associated with social status and that anomie is more likely to afflict the mobile, sensitive rich than ordinary people.[57] He found that industrial and commercial professions furnished the greatest number of suicides.[58] This was remarkable to him, because he felt that logically, "if voluntary deaths increased because life was becoming more difficult, they should

diminish as comfort increases."[59] Upward mobility brings with it both material comfort and anomie, in other words.

Andrew Henry and James Short see suicide as the outcome of two things: frustration and lack of legitimacy in aggressive feelings. Frustration is that which is produced when members of status group cannot maintain their position. Since they see suicide as having fundamentally the same source as homicide, they say that if aggression is perceived by the offender as having legitimacy, the offender will kill another. If it lacks legitimacy, the only option left is to kill oneself.[60] Short and Henry hypothesize that suicide rates increase in depressions and fall in prosperity, because those in high status groups face a greater relative loss in depressions than do those of low status. And since they link suicide with high status groups, suicide should increase in depressions.[61]

Another scholar, Stuart Palmer, puts forth his theory of reciprocity as the root of suicide in his book The Violent Society. Low reciprocity means that one's actions are inadequately recompensed, while high reciprocity means that one's actions are over-recompensed. High reciprocity, he says, is the cause of suicide, because low tension creates frustration and aggression. Lack of the fine balance of tension indigenous to our society puts a person off balance and creates self aggression. This theory is not easily compared with others, as it has no class component.[62]

Another point of view is held by Cavan and, strangely enough, by Durkheim. This perspective is that poverty is not conducive to suicide. Cavan says that hardship is not always

influential to self-destruction. To prove her point, she notes that there is more hardship in winter than in summer, but that there are fewer suicides during colder months. In addition, one can become inured to poverty, to learn to expect little from life, to not be crushed when things go wrong.[63] Durkheim agrees, saying that poverty is a limitation to which one can be acclimated, and that one cannot be disturbed by poverty if one is already poor.[64] Dublin disagrees, reporting on research done in England and Wales that found suicide prevalent at both the top and the bottom of the economic scales.[65]

The early scholars found suicide disproportionately associated with the rich and prestigious. Roger Lane, author of Violent Death in the City, states that several (unnamed) modern American scholars have found suicide more marked among the poor and the lowly. The way to reconcile these two viewpoints -- suicide among the rich or the poor -- is pointed out by Lane: Suicide has become democratized over time. More women, blacks, and younger people are now committing suicide than ever before, while white middle-aged rates have declined.[66] Of course, I am studying the depression and the period preceding it, which occurred before the democratization of suicide that Lane records -- indubitably more whites than others, more elderly people than younger, more men than women committed suicide during that period. I have found suicide closely linked to unemployment, which primarily hit the lower classes. Is this not proof to the contrary of Durkheim's thesis: how could the rich be committing suicide in great numbers while suicide is consistently linked to

unemployment? It may be that the rich did commit suicide in droves, but because the number of rich was small, it does not show up in the statistics. Even if they were, however, there were even more others who committed suicide, and many of them were affected by unemployment, as my tests have shown.

7. Timing

Scholars have looked into the question of timing of suicide -- not only during a person's life, but during the year, during the day. They have also discussed the roles played by wars and crises in the fluctuation of suicide rates. I was only able to verify a few assumptions about yearly patterns through use of the Mortality Statistics.

Durkheim, by studying the month in which people committed suicide, found that suicide is not dependent at all on temperature -- months of the same average temperature consistently have different rates.[67] He found the maximum number of suicides occurring in pleasant seasons; there were always more suicides in the six warmest than in the six coldest months.[68] Louis Dublin tries to ascribe a cause to this odd variation: "suicide is not a reaction to the physical hardships incidental to poverty, cold, or hunger, which press hardest in the winter months; on the contrary, spring time and the early summer months, the pleasantest months of the year, when the earth renews her vigor and when many forms of life start afresh, record the maximum incidence of suicide. We do not know whether this results from undiscovered physiological responses to changes in temperature, humidity, or other natural conditions, or whether it is due merely to the restlessness of 'spring fever' or to the

painful contrast between the suicide's own despair and the resurgence of life about him."[69]

To verify Durkheim's claims, I turned to the Mortality Statistics, which sometimes record the number of suicides per month. (See Table 6) From 1900 to 1940, the months were ranked, with May having the most suicides and February the least. If we count November through February as winter, March through June as spring, July to October as late summer/early fall, then spring has the most suicide, summer-fall next, and finally winter.

My findings support Durkheim's -- there are more suicides in the period of increasingly better weather every year. This discovery is slightly startling, because one tends to expect that harder physical conditions will lead to more self-destruction. Maybe this is an indicator that bad weather, which forces people into closer contact, breeds a sense of togetherness expressed in the low suicide rate. The depression was a period of difficult physical conditions, but the suicide rate rose instead of falling. Obviously, something more than just deprivation in terms of physical conditions occurred in the depression. The circumstance which best fits the bill is massive unemployment.

Durkheim's explanation for the seasonal phenomenon is that since he could not find cosmic factors that would explain the monthly variations of suicide, then there must be social conditions that do so. His conclusion is that, "if voluntary deaths increase from January to July, it is not because heat disturbs the organism, but because social life is more intense."[70]

Table 6: Suicides by month 1900-1940

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June
total	32469	30524	36484	37595	39297	36894
Average	983.909	924.9697	1105.576	1139.24	1190.818	1118

July	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
36458	34740	34005	34383	32457	32525	417831
1104.788	1052.727	1030.455	1041.909	983.5455	985.6061	12661.55

Rankings:
May
April
June
March
July
August
October
September
December
November
January
February

To substantiate his claim, Durkheim also investigated the time of day during which suicides most frequently occur. He found, upon inspecting two years' data, that the most suicides occurred between late morning and afternoon. The early morning, evening, and night had fewer suicides.[71] He feels that this day-time tendency for suicide proves his point, for didn't most suicides occur at a time when social life was at its height?[72]

There are other matters of timing -- beyond yearly and daily variations -- to be considered. For example, what is the effect of wars on the suicide rate? Many authors have pointed out that suicide statistics during wars are likely to be lower than normal if soldier's suicides are counted as war deaths. With that caveat in mind, let us examine Durkheim's position and find if it is upheld by the 1900-1940 statistics. Durkheim observed that political disturbances -- wars, revolutions, elections -- tend to coincide with a decrease in suicide rates for both men and women, for both conquerors and conquered.[73] Such a disturbance, he says, temporarily causes a stronger integration of society, because people think less of themselves and more of a common cause.[74] Ruth Cavan also found suicide rates decreasing in time of war in Chicago, but questioned whether the decrease was due to popular participation in a social movement or the fact that wars generally produce good business conditions.[75] The national suicide rate, after hitting a peak in 1908 (see Table 7), hovered around 16 per every 100,000 people until 1914. A brief section of Table 7 illustrates this point:

Table 7: Number of suicides per year and rate

Year	Nat'l pop.	suicide	Rate per 100,000 pop.
1900	30765618	3534	11.5
1901	31256456	3824	12.2
1902	31838263	4054	12.7
1903	32432647	4510	13.9
1904	32996989	4912	14.9
1905	33757811	5438	16.1
1906	40996317	5853	14.3
1907	41758137	6745	16.2
1908	45028767	8332	18.5
1909	50870518	8402	16.5
1910	53843896	8590	16
1911	59275977	9622	16
1912	60427133	9656	15.8
1913	63298718	9988	15.8
1914	65989295	10933	16.6
1915	67336992	11216	16.7
1916	71621632	10162	14.2
1917	75307906	10056	13.4
1918	81868104	9965	12.2
1919	85147822	9732	11.4
1920	87486713	8959	10.2
1921	88667602	11136	12.6
1922	93241643	11053	11.9
1923	99986371	11287	11.6
1924	99200298	12061	12.2
1925	103108000	12495	12.1
1926	105167000	13410	12.8
1927	108327000	14356	13.3
1928	114495000	15566	13.6
1929	116317515	16260	14
1930	118560800	18551	15.6
1931	119421200	20088	16.8
1932	120122200	20927	17.4
1933	125693000	19993	15.9
1934	126626000	18828	14.9
1935	127521000	18214	14.3
1936	128429000	18294	14.2
1937	129257000	19294	14.9
1938	130215000	19802	15.2
1939	130600617	18511	14.2
1940	131669275	18907	14.4

Year	Suicide rate per 100,000 people
1914	16.6
1915	16.7
1916	14.2
1917	13.4
1918	12.2
1919	11.4

The rate decreased rapidly after 1915. But these six years had high rates, in comparison with the following years. (See Table 7) 1939 and 1940 show no noticeable change from previous years. Thus it is not clear that wars -- or at least modern wars -- make a large difference to the suicide rate.

The question of war brings up the question of other sorts of crises. George Simpson, in his introduction to the Free Press' edition of Émile Durkheim's Suicide, notes that it is Durkheim's thesis that in crises of great magnitude the suicide rate falls because the crisis more strongly integrates society and the individual actively participates in social life.[76] I have already noted Durkheim's belief that wars, revolutions, and other disturbances tend to go hand-in-hand with a decrease in suicide rates. He holds that the crisis must excite popular passions to integrate society tightly, which in turn causes the rate to decrease.[77] However, Durkheim does not include financial crises among the crises that will inspire fewer suicides.

Durkheim holds, instead, that economic crises have an "aggravating effect on the suicidal tendency."[78] He says that the increase is not due to the fact that poverty is often a result of economic crises, because crises of prosperity have the same effect. What is important is their nature as crises -- the disturbance of equilibrium is an impulse to voluntary death.[79] A

distinction that he seems to be making but does not fully articulate is that industrial or financial crises change the social order, while wars and political disturbances tend to reinforce it. This point is necessary if one is to believe his distinction between the differing effects of differing crises. I am not sure, however, that such a distinction holds true when examined carefully.

Louis Dublin does not distinguish between types of crises. He says that a crisis calls for any of a variety of solutions, of which suicide is only one. That a person chooses suicide is usually dependent on his relations to the world around him.[80] Thus suicide becomes too personal a matter to generalize about in terms of types of crises. Ruth Cavan looks at the matter not in terms of crisis, but in terms of 'organization' and 'disorganization.' Social disorganization, she says, occurs when customs and habits usually found to be adequate fail to regulate a situation.[81] Personal disorganization occurs when adjustment cannot be made to a situation, which causes dissatisfaction, restlessness, and unhappiness.[82] Either type of disorganization can occur in any community and can be touched off by a crisis, which can, in turn, inspire some to take their own lives.

There are innumerable reasons to commit suicide. Failing health, loss of a loved one, revenge, or a social setback are but a few of the causes of suicide. At this juncture, I'd like to develop the point about the economy: what about economic crises, such as the depression? Durkheim says that political disturbances knit a society together and cause fewer suicides

than normal. He also said that economic crises give rise to an increased number of suicides. "In the case of economic disasters, indeed, something like a declassification occurs," he states, "which suddenly casts certain individuals into a lower state than their previous one. Then they must reduce their requirements, restrain their needs, learn greater self-control. All the advantages of social influence are lost so far as they are concerned; their moral education has to be recommenced. But society cannot adjust them simultaneously to this new life and teach them to practice the increased self-repression to which they are unaccustomed. So they are not adjusted to the condition forced on them, and its very prospect is intolerable; hence the suffering which detaches them from a reduced existence even before they have made trial of it."[83]

As I have discussed above, Short and Henry see a direct link between economic crises and violent death. Since frustration is produced by an inability to maintain social position, and since this frustration leads to suicide, it is those who cannot maintain social position that commit suicide. Depressions, they go on to say, hurt people of high status relatively more than those of low status. Thus high status people commit suicide during depression, because of their inability to stay at the top of the heap.[84]

A warning before proceeding to the topic of suicide during the depression: the relationship between economic adversity and increased suicide rates is not one-to-one. As Durkheim holds, individual events cannot be considered the cause of a suicide -- unless one is so inclined, no unhappiness in life can cause a

person to kill himself.[85] Dublin points out that a business crisis, though often associated with suicide, is not always followed by a rise in the suicide rate and the severity of the crisis gives no clue about the attendant rise in the suicide rate.[86] He says that in the last analysis it is the individual's constitution in relation to the stresses that he faces which make the difference.[87] Finally, William Ogburn and Dorothy Thomas, who wrote an article on the relationship of social conditions to business conditions, point out that "of course the fact that social statistics fluctuate simultaneously with indexes of the business cycle does not necessarily prove a causal influence, that is, that the economic changes produce the social changes."[88]

B. Suicide and the Depression.

> "The depression was an exceptionally disagreeable experience."
> -- John Kenneth Galbraith [89]

How many people believe that the stock market crash of October, 1929 sent hundreds of investors tumbling out of Wall Street skyscraper office windows? This deluge of plummeting businessmen is mythical. John Kenneth Galbraith, in his book The Crash, shows that newspapers and the public merely "seized on such suicides as occurred to show that people were reacting appropriately to their misfortune."[90] Curiously, few suicidal investors actually jumped from tall buildings.[91]

No matter how few people actually did jump out of windows, the press and the public seemed to feel a need for an expression of the horrible jeopardy in which the depression placed the nation. Peter Temin, in his book Did Monetary Forces Cause the

Great Depression?, attempted to date the exact point at which people began to lose their hopes for a quick recovery. He found, on economic evidence -- bond ratings, especially -- and on impressionistic evidence afforded by newspapers, that sometime in the fall of 1930 businessmen became convinced that prosperity was no longer just around the corner.[92] At what point did people actually give up hope? If we allow the use of suicide rates as indicators of popular optimism, this question can, perhaps, be answered by examining the suicide rates for the period 1929-1940.

Before examining the demographic trends during the depression, I'd like to point out what happened during that period. From 1900 to 1928, there were a few notable peaks and valleys in the graph of the suicide rate (see Graph 10). The rate rose steadily and peaked in 1908, the year of a smaller economic crisis, fell two points and remained steady until 1915, when it peaked again. From 1916 to 1920 it fell steeply, reaching its lowest point in 1920, but turned around and climbed slowly, until 1929. From that point until 1932, it rose at a very steep angle, peaking in 1932 at a slightly lower level than in 1908, then fell slowly to a temporary low in 1936, climbed again to a small peak in 1938. Before the depression, the rate, on average, was 13.97 suicides per 100,000 in the population. During the depression, it was 15.5 per 100,000 population, a difference of 1.18.

In an average year before 1929, 9345 people committed suicide -- 7175 men and 2170 women. In an average year during the depression, 20190 people committed suicide -- 15957 men and 4233 women -- more than doubling the actual number of suicides.



GRAPH 10: SUICIDE RATE PER YEAR, 1900-1940

The number of suicides did more than double after 1928, but in relation to the population, the rate only rose by 1.18 per 100,000 people.

With the overall pattern established, the subsidiary patterns can be examined. Were the demographics during this period any different from the preceding thirty years? Were they any different from those for the whole period (in other words, did the 1929-1940 suicides unduly influence the 1900-1940 data)? Who committed suicide during the depression?

1. Gender

The pattern with regard to sex that I found among suicides from 1900 to 1940 -- which shall be referred to as the 'normal' patterns -- was that men are more likely to commit suicide than are women, with a ratio of about one female to every 4 male suicides. Table 8 summarizes my findings on sex distribution from 1929 to 1940 and compares them to data for 1900-1929 and 1900-1940. For 1900-1928 -- the pre-depression years -- 23.2 percent of the suicides were female. From 1929 to 1940, women committed 20.9% of all suicides. In other words, for every 100 suicides before 1929, 23 were female; for every 100 suicides during the years 1929-1940, 21 were female. Using only the raw statistics, one finds that the average number of female suicides per year before 1929 was 2169; during the depression it was 4232 -- an increase of 2063 a year -- and almost twice the amount before 1929. More women than usual did commit suicide during the depression, but they were more than balanced out by men, whose suicides more than doubled per year during the depression. I

Table 8: Comparison of dist. of suicide by sex and age, 1900-28 & 1929-40

	Ages:	0-5	5-9	10-14	15-19	20-24	25-29
1900-28	M sum	0	15	539	4201	12999	16786
	M yr %		79	60	47	63	68
	M *%	.00	.01	.26	2.02	6.25	8.07
	F sum	0	4	353	4787	7762	7758
	F yr %		21	40	53	37	32
	F *%	.00	.01	.56	7.61	12.34	12.33
	Sum	0	19	892	8988	20761	24544
	sum *%	.00	.01	.33	3.32	7.66	9.06
1929-40	M sum	0	12	436	3337	8590	10966
	M yr %	0	92	71	57	66	68
	M *%	.00	.01	.23	1.74	4.49	5.73
	F sum	0	1	176	2547	4457	5056
	F yr %	0	8	29	43	34	32
	F *%	.00	.00	.35	5.01	8.77	9.95
	Sum	0	13	612	5884	13047	16022
	sum *%	.00	.01	.25	2.43	5.39	6.61

M yr % means the percentage of all suicides in an age range that are male

M *% means the percentage of all male suicides that are in an age range

Table 8: Comparison of dist. of suicide by sex and age, 1900-28 & 1929-40

30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49	50-54	55-59	60-64	65-69
18978	21881	21714	22793	22307	19358	16365	12537
73	76	78	80	82	83	84	85
9.12	10.51	10.43	10.95	10.72	9.30	7.86	6.02
7026	6745	5991	5674	4962	3902	3051	2159
27	24	22	20	18	17	16	15
11.17	10.72	9.52	9.02	7.89	6.20	4.85	3.43
26004	28626	27705	28467	27269	23260	19416	14696
9.60	10.56	10.22	10.50	10.06	8.58	7.16	5.42
12474	15155	17907	20192	36165	19028	16433	12816
70	73	77	79	88	83	84	85
6.51	7.91	9.35	10.54	18.89	9.94	8.58	6.69
5258	5476	5380	5471	4857	3969	3206	2323
30	27	23	21	12	17	16	15
10.35	10.78	10.59	10.77	9.56	7.81	6.31	4.57
17732	20631	23287	25663	41022	22997	19639	15139
7.32	8.52	9.61	10.59	16.93	9.49	8.11	6.25

70-74	75-79	80-84	85-89	90-94	95-99	100+	unknown
8284	5002	2364	861	174	30	5	904
86	87	87	86	85	71	83	91
3.98	2.40	1.14	.41	.08	.01	.00	.43
1343	763	358	136	30	12	1	92
14	13	13	14	15	29	17	9
2.13	1.21	.57	.22	.05	.02	.00	.15
9627	5765	2722	997	204	42	6	996
3.55	2.13	1.00	.37	.08	.02	.00	.37
8907	5400	2478	751	123	21	3	293
86	88	89	88	79	81	75	87
4.65	2.82	1.29	.39	.06	.01	.00	.15
1396	720	319	100	33	5	1	42
14	12	11	12	21	19	25	13
2.75	1.42	.63	.20	.06	.01	.00	.08
10303	6120	2797	851	156	26	4	335
4.25	2.53	1.15	.35	.06	.01	.00	.14

noted above that the men outnumbered the women three to one on relief rolls. The imbalance between the sexes in suicide mirrors that of the sexes on the relief rolls.

It is not clear why men should commit suicide more often than women, as noted above. However, one may speculate on the question of why mens' suicides doubled and womens' did not during the depression. Primarily, the working force was male. When a man lost his job, he lost his role as a provider for the family. He felt useless. When a woman lost her job, she still had that of nurturing her family, if she had one. Women were the beggars, reports Robert McElvaine, who collected letters to Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt during the depression.[92] When a man had nothing left, he had nothing left. When a woman had nothing left, she still had hope in the charity of friends or strangers. It would be very interesting, but probably impossible without extensive newspaper research, to find out which women committed suicide -- the single woman, the mother, the wife. My guess is that the suicide would be found primarily among the unmarried women, childless, divorced, or widowed.

2. Age

In the normal patterns, people committed suicide most often between the ages 50 and 54 and, more broadly based, 43% of the suicides took place between the ages 40 and 59. Women committed suicide primarily between the ages 25 and 29, and 44% of female suicides took place between the ages 20 and 39. Men primarily committed suicide between 50 and 54, and 45% of all male suicides took place between 40 and 59.

From 1900 to 1928, men committed suicide most often between ages 45 and 49 -- 11% percent of all male suicides took place within that age range. Between the ages 35 and 54, 43% of all male suicides occurred. Women, in this same period, most often committed suicide between 20 and 24, with 47% of female suicides occurring between 20 and 39.

During the depression, men usually committed suicide between the ages 50 and 54. (See Table 8) The dominant age for suicide for women occurred between the ages 20 and 39 before the depression. During the depression, the age group shifted to 30-49.

The numbers here are a little startling: nearly 19% of all the men who committed suicide during the depression were between the ages of 50 and 54, while beforehand a little less than 11% of male suicides occurred in this age group. The depression hit this male age group hard. 49% of all male suicides during the depression occurred between the ages 40 and 59 -- the dominant suicide ages shifted from 35-54 before the depression to 40-59. The depression took as its toll older people than those who took their lives before the crash. There was a sudden shift in suicide from 35 for men to 40, from 20 for women to 30. The depression fatally hurt not the relatively young -- as Lorena Hickok feared -- but the middle aged woman and the late middle aged man; these were the real victims of the depression.

3. Race

Unlike gender or age patterns, race demographics did not change during the depression. I found earlier that from 1923 to 1940 non-caucasians primarily committed suicide between the ages

20 and 39, earlier in life than the group as a whole. The period for which race was specified in the Mortality Statistics began in 1923. From 1923 to 1928, 13% of all non-white suicides occurred between the ages of 25 and 29, while 53% took place between the ages 20 and 39. From 1929 to 1940, non-white suicides were concentrated in the same age ranges. (See Tables 9 and 10) Male suicides before the depression were concentrated in the 25 to 44 age range, while female suicides were concentrated in the 20 to 39 age range. Neither of these concentrations were disturbed by the depression. From 1900 to 1940, only 3.3 percent of all suicides were committed by non-whites and the percentage stayed the same both before and during the depression. The only conclusion to be drawn from this evidence is that either the sample is not large enough to show the effects of the depression or there were no such effects on non-whites.

Caucasian suicides did show these effects. From 1923 to 1928, the dominant age range for suicide was 35 to 54; from 1929 to 1940, it was 40 to 59. For men, pre-depression times were associated primarily with suicides between the ages 45 and 49; during the depression, that concentration shifted quite markedly to the 50 to 54 age range, although the twenty year concentration period remained the same -- 40 to 59. For white women, 1923-1928 meant suicides between the ages 30-34 specifically and 25 to 44 generally. During the depression, the primary concentration for females shifted to the 45-49 age range, and the twenty year period to 30-49.

Table 9: Comparison of dist. of white suicide by sex and age, 1923-28 & 1929-40

	Ages:	0-5	5-9	10-14	15-19	20-24	25-29
1923-1928	M sum	0	4	150	1007	2728	3606
	M *%	.00	.01	.26	1.75	4.74	6.27
	F sum	0	0	97	1019	1751	1874
	F *%	.00	.00	.55	5.76	9.89	10.58
	sum	0	4	247	2026	4479	5480
	sum *%	.00	.01	.33	2.69	5.95	7.28
1929-1940	M sum	0	11	404	3129	8040	10271
	M *%	.00	.01	.22	1.68	4.33	5.53
	F sum	0	1	141	2360	4083	4732
	F *%	.00	.00	.29	4.83	8.35	9.68
	sum	0	12	545	5489	12123	15003
	sum *%	.00	.01	.23	2.34	5.17	6.39

30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49	50-54	55-59	60-64	65-69
4421	5671	6025	6490	6485	5766	5213	4229
7.69	9.86	10.47	11.28	11.27	10.02	9.06	7.35
1926	1888	1875	1756	1637	1297	1008	729
10.88	10.66	10.59	9.92	9.25	7.33	5.69	4.12
6347	7559	7900	8246	8122	7063	6221	4958
8.44	10.05	10.50	10.96	10.80	9.39	8.27	6.59
11823	14433	17292	19608	35634	18655	16111	12640
6.36	7.77	9.31	10.55	19.18	10.04	8.67	6.80
4983	5281	5218	5359	4768	3919	3158	2291
10.20	10.81	10.68	10.97	9.76	8.02	6.46	4.69
16806	19714	22510	24967	40402	22574	19269	14931
7.16	8.40	9.59	10.64	17.22	9.62	8.21	6.36

*% means the percentage of all suicides that are within this age group

70-74	75-79	80-84	85-89	90-94	95-99	100+	unknown
2853	1663	731	271	52	5	2	154
4.96	2.89	1.27	.47	.09	.01	.00	.27
424	245	103	46	8	3	1	19
2.39	1.38	.58	.26	.05	.02	.01	.11
3277	1908	834	317	60	8	3	173
4.36	2.54	1.11	.42	.08	.01	.00	.23
8795	5327	2453	744	119	21	0	271
4.73	2.87	1.32	.40	.06	.01	.00	.15
1386	705	313	97	31	5	0	40
2.84	1.44	.64	.20	.06	.01	.00	.08
10181	6032	2766	841	150	26	0	311
4.34	2.57	1.18	.36	.06	.01	.00	.13

Table 10: Comparison of dist. of non-white suicide by sex and age, 1925-28 & 1929-40

	Ages:	0-5	5-9	10-14	15-19	20-24	25-29
1923-1928	M sum	0	0	8	60	180	239
	M *%	.00	.00	.43	3.25	9.76	12.96
	F sum	0	0	6	60	106	124
	F *%	.00	.00	.93	9.35	16.51	19.31
	sum	0	0	14	120	'286	363
	sum *%	.00	.00	.56	4.83	11.50	14.60
1929-1940	M sum	0	1	32	208	550	695
	M *%	.00	.02	.56	3.65	9.64	12.18
	F sum	0	0	35	187	374	324
	F *%	.00	.00	1.82	9.73	19.46	16.86
	sum	0	1	67	395	924	1019
	sum *%	.00	.01	.88	5.18	12.11	13.36

30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49	50-54	55-59	60-64	65-69
230	260	206	187	144	118	79	57
12.47	14.10	11.17	10.14	7.81	6.40	4.28	3.09
107	71	57	42	25	19	9	5
16.67	11.06	8.88	6.54	3.89	2.96	1.40	.78
337	331	263	229	169	137	88	62
13.56	13.31	10.58	9.21	6.80	5.51	3.54	2.49
651	722	615	584	531	373	322	176
11.41	12.65	10.78	10.23	9.31	6.54	5.64	3.08
275	195	162	112	89	50	48	32
14.31	10.15	8.43	5.83	4.63	2.60	2.50	1.66
926	917	777	696	620	423	370	208
12.14	12.02	10.19	9.12	8.13	5.55	4.85	2.73

*% means the percentage of all suicides that are within an age group

70-74	75-79	80-84	85-89	90-94	95-99	100+	unknown
35	17	10	4	0	0	0	10
1.90	.92	.54	.22	.00	.00	.00	.54
5	1	3	0	1	1	0	0
.78	.16	.47	.00	.16	.16	.00	.00
40	18	13	4	1	1	0	10
1.61	.72	.52	.16	.04	.04	.00	.40
112	73	25	7	4	0	3	22
1.96	1.28	.44	.12	.07	.00	.05	.39
10	15	6	3	2	0	1	2
.52	.78	.31	.16	.10	.00	.05	.10
122	88	31	10	6	0	4	24
1.60	1.15	.41	.13	.08	.00	.05	.31

One may conclude, then, that the depression did not hurt older (over 40) non-whites as much as it did older whites. This is not to say that the non-whites were not affected by the depression -- non-white suicide on average increased by more than half during the depression. In proportion to the population, however, there was little detectable change. One may speculate that the non-whites were used to discrimination and hard luck based on discrimination due to skin color, so the depression was not a huge change for them. Further, the main constituent of the non-whites were blacks, who had and have very large social support structures; they had more to fall back on than did the whites.

4. Residence

For the first four decades of this century, suicides were found more often in cities than in rural areas. This distribution was maintained throughout the depression period, although there were more rural suicides than previously. (see Table 11) From 1910 to 1928, 3.1 percent of all urban suicides were committed by non-whites, and 2.6 percent of all rural suicides were committed by non-whites. From 1929 to 1938, 3.7 percent of all urban suicides were committed by non-whites and 3.0 percent of the rural suicides were committed by non-whites. Non-caucasians, then, committed more suicides than usual in both rural and urban areas during the depression. However, the numbers are so small that the changes are almost imperceptible.

The urban/rural difference does not change much during the depression, so I think the comments made earlier on possible reasons for the differences still hold. I will add, however,

Table 11: Comparison of dist. of suicide by residence, 1900-28 & 1929-1940

1900-1928	40.9 percent of total suicides are rural 59.1 percent of total suicides are urban
1929-1940	44.5 percent of total suicides are rural 55.5 percent of total suicides are urban
1900-1928	3.1 percent of all urban suicides are committed by non-whites 2.6 percent of all rural suicides are committed by non-whites
1929-1940	3.7 percent of all urban suicides are committed by non-whites 3.0 percent of all rural suicides are committed by non-whites

that in this period, 1900-1940, a greater number of blacks -- as the dominant race among the non-whites -- lived in rural areas than in urban areas, which is all the more reason for low rates for both rural areas and non-whites.

5. Timing

I noted above that one of the more fascinating aspects of suicide is its seasonality. The overall pattern was spring first in numbers of suicides, summer-fall next, and winter last. Did this pattern change during the depression, perhaps to coordinate with times of inadequate relief? I found, on the whole, that it did not. Table 13 below summarizes the patterns for the whole period, for the pre-depression years, and for the depression.

Table 13: Suicides by month

1900-1940	1900-1928	1929-1940
May	May	May
April	April	April
June	June	June
March	July	March
July	March	July
August	August	August
October	October	October
September	September	September
December	November	December
November	January	January
January	December	November
February	February	February

There is a slight rearranging of July and March, and of December, January, and November. The seasons stay in their place from one period to the next. The depression didn't change reactions to seasons of the year or events associated with them that may have been triggers for committing suicide. Nor did seasons when inadequate relief would be hardest to bear -- fall and winter -- show more suicide than usual during the depression.

Table 12: Suicides by month - comparison

		Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June
1900-1940	total	32469	30524	36484	37595	39297	36894
	average	983.909	924.9697	1105.576	1139.24	1190.818	1118
1900-1928	total	14536	13978	16620	17113	17964	17000
	average	692.190	665.6190	791.4286	814.905	855.4286	809.5238
1929-1940	total	17933	16546	19864	20482	21333	19894
	average	1494.42	1378.833	1655.333	1706.83	1777.75	1657.833

July	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
36458	34740	34005	34383	32457	32525	417831
1104.788	1052.727	1030.455	1041.909	983.5455	985.6061	12661.55
16679	15770	15435	15628	14946	14493	190194
794.2381	750.9524	735	744.1905	711.7143	690.1429	9056.857
19779	18970	18570	18755	17511	18032	227669
1648.25	1580.833	1547.5	1562.917	1459.25	1502.667	18972.42

Rankings	1900-1940	'00-28	'29-40
	May	May	May
	Apr	Apr	Apr
	Jun	Jun	Jun
	Mar	Jul	Mar
	Jul	Mar	Jul
	Aug	Aug	Aug
	Oct	Oct	Oct
	Sep	Sep	Sep
	Dec	Nov	Dec
	Nov	Jan	Jan
	Jan	Dec	Nov
	Feb	Feb	Feb

CONCLUSIONS

Graph 11 compares suicide rates to death rates during the period 1900-1940. The suicides are measured in terms of suicides per every 100,000 people, the death rates in terms of deaths per every 1,000 people. With the discrepancy in scale, one can compare the two indicators on the same graph. Death rates decline pretty steadily during the depression years, while suicide rates fluctuate quite a bit. If one were to use the suicide rates as the only indicators of society's well being during that period, one would be forced to say that 1932 marked the hardest year of the depression, followed by 1938.

Graph 12 shows both the suicide rates and the percentage unemployed measured to the same scale. Suicide hits its all-time high in 1932, but unemployment peaks in 1933. Except for that difference, most peaks and valleys, even before 1929, coincide. The reason why the statistic that measures the relatedness of unemployment rates and suicide rates is so high is that the two variables coincide in direction: when one rises, the other rises, and vice versa.

In this chapter I have argued that one can use suicide rates as societal indicators, examined Emile Durkheim's tenets and others' reactions to them, questioned whether the unemployed committed suicide or not, and discussed differences between pre-depression and depression patterns. The most startling thing I found was that the depression really did influence one aspect of suicide: age. The constituency of the group of suicides changed

and was primarily composed of people older than those who committed suicide before 1928.

I have discussed my reluctance to commit myself to the statement that those who found life hardest to bear were the unemployed. On the cautionary side, there were three main arguments: first, that merely because unemployment and suicide vary together does not necessarily mean that one causes the other; second, that the unemployed were a constantly changing group of people; third, that only the fact of joblessness separates the employed from the unemployed -- the two groups experienced the depression in much the same way. On the other side are the arguments that a) other historians would probably not be deterred by these arguments and claim that the unemployed committed suicide; b) there is a statistically proven link between the two; and c) it could be argued that the fact of unemployment is the difference that influences suicide. I prefer to leave the final judgment of this question up to the reader.

Suicide rates and the examination thereof are investigations into people's breaking points. Another indicator of the state of society is the homicide rates. Were homicide victims akin to suicides? Were homicides also influenced by the depression?

11.E. Death rate measured per 1,000 pop; Suicide Rate measured per 100,000 pop



GRAPH 12: UNEMPLOYMENT AND SUICIDE RATES, 1900-1940



CHAPTER 3: ENDNOTES

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53. George M. Carstairs, "Overcrowding and Human Aggression" in Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, eds.' The History of Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), p. 758.

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55. Religion: Durkheim found that Protestant countries showed higher suicide rates than groups that were primarily Jewish or Catholic. Generally, there were fewer Jewish suicides than Catholics. Protestant and Catholic Christianity equally emphasize the belief in punishment for suicides, so fear of retribution cannot account for the differing rates.(Durkheim p. 155, 157)

    Why the disparity in suicide rates among religious groups? It has not only to do with the integration of the group but the education of its members, Durkheim maintains. Why should there be more Protestant suicides than either Jewish or Catholic? Protestanism allows greater freedom to individual thought than does Catholicism; there is less cohesion and vitality in the group; and there is less consistency.(Durkheim p. 158) Jews have a sense of solidarity which helps to integrate the group, Durkheim believes. He also thinks that the Jews do not employ

individual judgement but instead live by dogma. Jews are more educated, on the whole, than either other group, but the Jew seeks to learn not to replace his religion but to buttress his community -- he has "the intelligence of modern man without his despair."(Durkheim, p. 168) Finally, Durkheim holds that the learning acquired does not disorganize religion, but the desire for knowledge -- for something to replace his religion -- wakens when his religion becomes disorganized; faith must already be unsure to be shaken by argument.(Durkheim, p. 169)

Other scholars of suicide have pondered the question of religion and of Durkheim's analysis. Dublin recognizes that where the church is strong and duties are rigidly prescribed, there are generally fewer suicides.(Dublin, p. 74) Ruth Cavan also agrees with Durkheim that religious doctrines themselves don't cause the differences in suicide rates, but that the organizing effects of the religion do.(Cavan, p. 44) She points out, though, that in 1920s Chicago, the basis of her study, there is some correspondence of religion with education and occupation. Generally poor education and an unskilled occupation are linked with Catholicism, while a good education and a skilled occupation are linked with Protestant sects. Which factor of the three is the decisive one?

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68. Durkheim, pp. 121-22.

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74. Durkheim, p. 208.

75. Cavan, p. 275.

76. George Simpson, in the introduction to Durkheim's Suicide, p. 14.

77. Durkheim, p. 208.

78. Durkheim, p. 241.

79. Durkheim, p. 246.

80. Dublin, p. 165.

81. Cavan, p. 107.

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HOMICIDE AND THE DEPRESSION

> Last Friday Frank Sterling, 50, who had been living apart from his wife, a resident of Spencer, went to the wife's home in a hired taxi, shot at her three times in an attempt to kill her and then attempted to take his own life. Both will recover.
> -- Oberlin News, June 7, 1922

Somewhere in Dostoyevsky's The Brothers Karamozov, Ivan Karamozov says that there is no crime that he could not imagine committing. As I've worked on this project for quite some time now, I begin to understand what he means. However, I tend to believe that I would kill myself before I would turn my hand against another in violence. Apparently, most Americans between the years 1900 and 1940 felt the same way, as the suicide rate is always higher than the homicide rate. The question of how much misery and hardship one can endure before taking drastic steps still remains. As the focus of the last section was one indicator of breaking points -- suicide -- this chapter's focus is homicide, its normal and Great Depression patterns, and the differences and similarities between those patterns and those of suicide.

In the last chapter, I stated that, as a result of statistical analysis, one could be fairly confident that the state of the economy, as reflected in unemployment rates, plays a large role in determining the incidence of suicide. (Please see the Appendix for a fuller explanation) Unfortunately, those same tests did not produce anything quite as clear for homicide. The best equation that includes economic factors does not explain more than a third of the changes in the national homicide rate. Its determining variables are the change in the unemployment rate

from one year to the next and the change in wages that occurred the year before. The fact that this equation cannot explain even half the variation in homicide rates means that either the state of the economy does not have a great effect on the homicide rate, or that it does but that I have missed the economic variables that would prove it. I doubt the second case.

An article on crime and employment by Daniel Glaser and Kent Rice states that a review of past research "makes it clear that no marked and consistent relationships have been established between overall or specific crime rates and economic conditions."[1] Again, in a more sophisticated study, M. Harvey Brenner also found inconclusive evidence concerning the economy and homicide rates. He found that unemployment and inflation were linked to modern homicide rates, so that more of one leads to more of the other, but also found that as per capita income increased, so did the homicide rate.[2] His findings are quite as equivocal as mine.

If the economy and homicide are not linked conclusively, why study homicide for the depression period? First, it is possible that I'm wrong, and they are more closely connected. Second, it is instructive to examine the differences that appear between depression and pre-depression times. Third, some authors contend that suicide and homicide have fundamentally the same cause, so if suicide patterns show who was affected by the depression, the homicide patterns should do the same. Fourth, this is a counterpart to the analysis of suicide, and it clarifies the differences between suicide and homicide patterns.

There will be much less discussion of the points of view of different scholars in this chapter, mainly as a result of the amazing number of opinions held by the large number of scholars of this topic. Additionally, there is no single recognized leading authority on homicide, as Durkheim is for suicide. After a brief discussion of homicide rates and their changes over time, I will proceed with an analysis along much the same lines as in the last chapter, discussing gender, age groups, race, residence, and timing. A concluding section will discuss the similarities and differences of suicide and homicide patterns.

HOMICIDE

A. HOMICIDE OVER TIME

First, a definition. Legally, homicide is a non-accidental death caused by someone other than the deceased.[3] No distinction will be made here between the different degrees of murder. The homicide rate is thus an expression of how many people were killed by others, not how many killed, were arrested, indicted, or punished. This distinction is necessary, because one person can cause more than one death. Each of the victims is counted, not the single killer.

As you will see from glancing at Graph 13, the homicide rate is not nearly as smooth as the suicide rate. Minor peaks occur every few years. It started out low in 1900, gradually rose to a peak in 1908, bumped along, rising slowly, to reach a small trough in 1920, followed by a peak in 1921. It rose slowly to a peak in 1932, followed by a deep depression in 1935, and another peak in 1936. It dropped precipitately after that.

Squares to the inch

RATE PER 100,

22.0

20.0

18.0

16.0

1932

GRAPH 13: NATIONAL HOMICIDE RATE, 1900-1940

Roger Lane, an authority on violence in the nineteenth century and author of Violent Death in the City, points out that in doing historical work of this kind, one should keep in mind that many who died in former times might not have if appropriate medical care had been available. In fact the rising homicide rate, combined with increasingly better and quicker medical care, means that unsuccessful murderous attempts were probably more numerous over time.[4] Lane also points out that homicide rates might have been higher, had lethal firearms been more readily available -- it is harder to beat or choke someone to death than it is to shoot them.[5] I'm unsure whether firearms were easily accessible from 1900 to 1940, but I think one can assume that they became more plentiful over time and that probably accounts for some of the rise in the homicide rate. Above and beyond the rates, what are the demographic patterns? Who are the victims of homicide?

1. Gender

Overall (1900-1940), 19.934 percent of all victims of homicide were female. Before the depression, 19.958 percent were female and during the depression, 19.907 percent were female. In other words, a very few more women were victims before the depression than during. There was, however, no really discernible change due to the economic crisis. (See Table 14)

Just as with suicide, the average number of homicide victims per year increased during the depression. For both sexes, the average number per year more than doubled (ratio = 2.15). Again, caution: these are the raw data, not the population adjusted rates. One thing that clinches the conclusion that the

Table 14: Dist. of hom. victims by sex - comparison 1900-28, 1929-40, & total

1900-1928:	19.95779	percent of all homicide victims are female
	80.04221	percent of all homicide victims are male
1929-1940:	19.90747	percent of all homicide victims are female
	80.09253	percent of all homicide victims are male
1900-1940:	19.93405	percent of all homicide victims are female
	80.06595	percent of all homicide victims are male

depression had no effect on what sex the victims were is the fact that the percentage increase during the depression is the same for members of both sexes; the depression did not change who got murdered.

Most of the studies encountered while doing this research have confirmed the finding that men are more likely than women to be the victims of homicide.[6] Some say that men are engaged in competitive and at times highly unreciprocating -- to use Stuart Palmer's term -- interaction to a greater extent than are females.[7] Others say that altercations over money, which usually concern men, are at the root of most homicides.[8] When women kill, the consensus seems to be that they kill husbands, children, or lovers.[9] Marvin E. Wolfgang's 1954 study, Patterns in Criminal Homicide, shows that when a man is killed by a woman, the woman is most likely to be his wife and that when a woman kills she is most likely to kill her spouse.[10] The reasons women kill those closest to them are first, that women have a more restricted sphere than men -- most of their interaction is within the family[11] -- and second, that while men are often rewarded for aggressive behavior women are socialized to conform and to be less aggressive.[12] One exception to this pattern is noted by Andrew Henry and James Short in Suicide and Homicide: women are nearly always killers of children less than one year of age.[13]

2. Age

Overall, the patterns for age distribution did not change. Before and during the depression, both men and women were most often killed between the ages 20 and 39. (See Graphs 14, 15, 16,

Table 15: Dist. of hom. victims by sex and age - comparison 1900-28, 1929-40, & total

	Ages:	0-4	5-9	10-14	15-19	20-24	25-29
1900-1928	M sum	2439	647	1068	5930	15822	18775
	M *%	2.25	.60	.98	5.47	14.59	17.31
	F sum	2154	521	510	2724	5095	4570
	F *%	7.96	1.93	1.89	10.07	18.84	16.90
	sum	4593	1168	1578	8654	20917	23345
	sum *%	3.39	.86	1.16	6.39	15.43	17.23
1929-1940	M sum	1146	424	711	5436	14076	15254
	M *%	1.18	.44	.73	5.61	14.52	15.73
	F sum	1012	392	431	2381	4466	4217
	F *%	4.20	1.63	1.79	9.88	18.53	17.50
	sum	2158	816	1142	7817	18542	19471
	sum *%	1.78	.67	.94	6.46	15.32	16.09
1900-1940	M sum	3585	1071	1779	11366	29898	34029
	M *%	1.75	.52	.87	5.53	14.55	16.57
	F sum	3166	913	941	5105	9561	8787
	F *%	6.19	1.79	1.84	9.98	18.69	17.18
	sum	6751	1984	2720	16471	39459	42816
	sum *%	2.63	.77	1.06	6.42	15.38	16.69

*% means percentage of all suicides for that group in an age range

30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49	50-54	55-59	60-64	65-69
16298	15187	10341	7777	5254	3258	2100	1350
15.02	14.00	9.53	7.17	4.84	3.00	1.94	1.24
3483	2730	1795	1218	738	449	309	234
12.88	10.09	6.64	4.50	2.73	1.66	1.14	.87
19781	17917	12136	8995	5992	3707	2409	1584
14.60	13.22	8.96	6.64	4.42	2.74	1.78	1.17
13792	13278	9790	7649	5429	3687	2519	1688
14.23	13.70	10.10	7.89	5.60	3.80	2.60	1.74
3058	2647	1769	1264	732	566	388	301
12.69	10.99	7.34	5.25	3.04	2.35	1.61	1.25
16850	15925	11559	8913	6161	4253	2907	1989
13.92	13.16	9.55	7.36	5.09	3.51	2.40	1.64
30090	28465	20131	15426	10683	6945	4619	3038
14.65	13.86	9.80	7.51	5.20	3.38	2.25	1.48
6541	5377	3564	2482	1470	1015	697	535
12.79	10.51	6.97	4.85	2.87	1.98	1.36	1.05
36631	33842	23695	17908	12153	7960	5316	3573
14.28	13.19	9.24	6.98	4.74	3.10	2.07	1.39

70-74	75-79	80-84	85-89	90-94	95-99	100+	unkn.
686	361	131	62	19	1	3	965
.63	.33	.12	.06	.02	.00	.00	.89
171	102	54	20	7	3	1	159
.63	.38	.20	.07	.03	.01	.00	.59
857	463	185	82	26	4	4	1124
.63	.34	.14	.06	.02	.00	.00	.83
868	450	181	77	16	8	2	463
.90	.46	.19	.08	.02	.01	.00	.48
162	128	81	33	10	1	1	56
.67	.53	.34	.14	.04	.00	.00	.23
1030	578	262	110	26	9	3	519
.85	.48	.22	.09	.02	.01	.00	.43
1554	811	312	139	35	9	5	1428
.76	.39	.15	.07	.02	.00	.00	.70
333	230	135	53	17	4	2	215
.65	.45	.26	.10	.03	.01	.00	.42
1887	1041	447	192	52	13	7	1643
.74	.41	.17	.07	.02	.01	.00	.64

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GRAPH 14: PERCENTAGE OF HOMICIDE VICTIMS BY AGE GROUP 1900-1940



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20 Squares to the Inch

GRAPH 15: PERCENTAGE OF MALE HOMICIDE VICTIMS BY AGE GROUP 1991-1240



GRAPH 16: PERCENTAGE OF FEMALE HOMICIDE VICTIMS BY AGE GROUP 1980 - 1984

20 Squares to the inch

Per-
centage

16.0
14.0
6.0
4.0
2.0

0-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80-84 85-89 90-94 95+

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GRAPH 17: PERCENTAGE OF HOMICIDE VICTIMS BY AGE GROUP - COMPARISON



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17 and Table 15) The only change that did occur in this respect is that the percentage of victims encompassed in this age group grew higher during the depression. Beyond that, however, nothing changed and the depression seems to have had no effect on the gender patterns of the victims or at what age they were killed.

One thing I found very interesting was to compare the sexes on early fatalities. Overall, six percent of all female victims of homicide were between the ages of 0 and 4. Before the depression, this percentage was closer to eight percent, and during the depression, it was around four percent. Of all male victims of homicide, a much smaller percentage were younger than 5. Why should there be more likelihood of being killed before the age of five if one is female? Is it possible that female infanticide is a force to reckon with? Or are female toddlers very irritating? (See Graph 17) The percentages of young victims dropped very noticeably during the depression, but if this does reflect infanticide, one would hope that the drop represents a long term trend rather than a change due to the depression. By rights, children should have had less of a chance during the depression -- one more mouth to feed is never welcome when adults don't know where <u>their</u> next meal is coming from, let alone the childrens'.

Once again, the studies encountered bear out my discoveries with regard to age -- homicide victims are found most often in the age group between 20 and 39.[14] Stuart Palmer hypothesized that in early adulthood individuals are most likely to come up against "insurmountable social blockages to their aspirations for the successful playing out of their roles."[15] His implication is

that such blockages are factors in causing homicide. Not having read any studies on infanticide, I cannot comment on whether it is a trend that decreases over time or whether the depression actually had a prohibitive effect on it.

3. Race

Whites comprised a little more than half of all victims of homicide throughout the period. During the depression, non-whites comprised a slightly larger proportion of the whole than before.

The dominant age group for white and non-white men was 20 to 39 before and during the depression. The dominant age group for white and non-white women before the depression was 15 to 34. During the depression, white women moved up to 20 to 39 while non-white women were still mainly killed when they were between the ages 15 to 34.

Although the non-white age groups were always more concentrated than the whites', a trend that occurred during the depression for both groups was that there was generally less killing of those under 15 and more of those in the older ranges -- 40 to 79 or so. (See Table 16)

Except for cases of race conflict -- riots, lynchings, etc. -- most homicide is intraracial. According to Wolfgang, blacks kill blacks and whites kill whites.[16] In his study, Wolfgang classifies who kills whom and how. Whites, he says, are most likely to be killed by relatives, while blacks are more likely to be slain by a close friend.[17] Whites were more likely to beat,

Table 16: Comparison of dist. of homicide victims by race, 1900-28, 1929-40, & total

	Ages	0-4	5-9	10-14	15-19	20-24	25-29
1923-1928	sum	1270	351	525	3293	7969	8881
	sum *%	2.47	.68	1.02	6.41	15.51	17.28
	sum wh	1107	285	316	1670	3683	4254
	wh *%	3.83	.99	1.09	5.78	12.75	14.73
	sum ot	163	66	209	1623	4286	4627
	ot *%	.72	.29	.93	7.21	19.05	20.56
1929-1940	sum	2158	816	1142	7817	18542	19471
	sum *%	1.78	.67	.94	6.46	15.32	16.09
	sum wh	1829	675	691	3498	7893	8373
	wh *%	2.89	1.07	1.09	5.53	12.48	13.24
	sum ot	329	141	451	4319	10649	11098
	ot *%	.57	.24	.78	7.47	18.43	19.20
1900-1940	sum	3428	1167	1667	11110	26511	28352
	sum *%	1.99	.68	.97	6.44	15.38	16.44
	sum wh	2936	960	1007	5168	11576	12627
	wh *%	3.19	1.04	1.09	5.61	12.56	13.71
	sum ot	492	207	660	5942	14935	15725
	ot *%	.61	.26	.82	7.40	18.60	19.58

*% means percentage of all suicides for that group in an age range

30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49	50-54	55-59	60-64	65-69
7725	6885	4725	3429	2358	1450	964	634
15.03	13.40	9.19	6.67	4.59	2.82	1.88	1.23
4078	3755	2919	2206	1613	1109	740	502
14.12	13.00	10.11	7.64	5.58	3.84	2.56	1.74
3647	3130	1806	1223	745	341	224	132
16.21	13.91	8.03	5.43	3.31	1.52	1.00	.59
16850	15925	11559	8913	6161	4253	2907	1989
13.92	13.16	9.55	7.36	5.09	3.51	2.40	1.64
7611	7871	6584	5409	4104	3130	2220	1520
12.03	12.44	10.41	8.55	6.49	4.95	3.51	2.40
9239	8054	4975	3504	2057	1123	687	469
15.99	13.94	8.61	6.06	3.56	1.94	1.19	.81
24575	22810	16284	12342	8519	5703	3871	2623
14.25	13.23	9.44	7.16	4.94	3.31	2.25	1.52
11689	11626	9503	7615	5717	4239	2960	2022
12.69	12.62	10.31	8.27	6.21	4.60	3.21	2.19
12886	11184	6781	4727	2802	1464	911	601
16.05	13.93	8.45	5.89	3.49	1.82	1.13	.75

70-74	75-79	80-84	85-89	90-94	95-99	100+	unkn.
336	167	68	28	15	2	2	310
.65	.32	.13	.05	.03	.00	.00	.60
284	138	52	20	10	2	1	139
.98	.48	.18	.07	.03	.01	.00	.48
52	29	16	8	5	0	1	171
.23	.13	.07	.04	.02	.00	.00	.76
1030	578	262	110	26	9	3	519
.85	.48	.22	.09	.02	.01	.00	.43
820	470	216	89	16	4	1	224
1.30	.74	.34	.14	.03	.01	.00	.35
210	108	46	21	10	5	2	295
.36	.19	.08	.04	.02	.01	.00	.51
1366	745	330	138	41	11	5	829
.79	.43	.19	.08	.02	.01	.00	.48
1104	608	268	109	26	6	2	363
1.20	.66	.29	.12	.03	.01	.00	.39
262	137	62	29	15	5	3	466
.33	.17	.08	.04	.02	.01	.00	.58

shoot, or stab each other, while blacks were more likely to stab, shoot, or beat each other, in that order of preference.[18]

4. Residence

There were more urban homicide victims than rural all but once (1938) from 1900 to 1940. From 1900 to 1928, 58% of all homicide victims were urban; during the depression, only 55% were. There must have been more rural homicides than usual during the depression.

From 1921 to 1928 (the Census Bureau started tallying race in 1921 for residence), 42% of all rural victims were non-white, while in urban areas the percentage was very slightly lower -- 41.73%. From 1929 to 1938, 44% of all rural victims were non-white, while in urban areas the percentage was 51. It is hard to determine if this dramatic increase in the number of non-white urban victims is due to the events of the depression or whether it is part of a long term trend. (See Graph 18)

None of the studies I've read have dealt with residence.

5. Timing

The Census Bureau only began to keep track of the months in which homicide occurred in 1937. Consequently, I have only four years worth of data on which to base the seasonal ratings. For those four years, the months are ranked with July having the most deaths by homicide and February the least.

GRAPH 18: URBAN AND RURAL HOMICIDE VICTIMS 1900-1940



20 Squares to the Inch

Table 17: Homicide victims by month

July
August
October
December
September
June
May
March
April
November
January
February

The seasons would thus be ranked late summer-fall, spring, and then winter. December presents an anomaly, however -- it is mixed in with the summer-fall group, being ranked fourth. December brings to my mind holidays and merry-making. Such events may well be conducive to homicide, as Durkheim holds that family life stimulates murder.[19]

Since I do not have the requisite data, I cannot trace changes from pre-depression to depression years to see if the economic situation had any effect on the yearly patterns of homicide.

Although Wolfgang rejects any causal relationship between months or seasons and the incidence of homicide, he found, as I did, that most killing occurred in the summer, followed by spring and fall, and then winter.[20] Palmer and Wolfgang agree that homicide is most prevalent on the weekends, when both alcohol consumption and social interaction levels are high.[21]

B. SOME THEORIES OF HOMICIDE

Andrew Henry and James Short work out a nicely constructed hypothesis in their book Suicide and Homicide. I have already discussed this in the last chapter, but here its main points are

Table 17: Homicides by month

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July
total	2659	2595	2901	2772	2929	2961	3267
average	664.75	648.75	725.25	693	732.25	740.25	816.75

July	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
3267	3255	2982	3119	2670	3102	35212
816.75	813.75	745.5	779.75	667.5	775.5	8803

Rankings: July
August
October
December
September
June
May
March
April
November
January
February

briefly recounted. First, they assume that frustration produces aggression, and frustrations are generated by interference with a person's goals. Since their book links economic factors to suicide and homicide, they designate people's goals as being maintaining or achieving a better social position.[22] Henry and Short then discuss the assumption that the basic and primary target of aggression is another person rather than the self. When aggression is seen by the aggressor as lacking legitimacy it is directed towards the self (hence suicide). When it is defined as legitimate by the aggressor, it becomes other-oriented (hence homicide).[23]

Moving to the specifics of homicide, Henry and Short hypothesize that there is a negative relation between social status and homicide (upper class people show lower incidence of homicide than do lower class denizens). They test this hypothesis in various ways,[25] but do not come up with conclusive evidence that they are correct or incorrect, which does not deter them from claiming this hypothesis as truth. A second hypothesis, which they were unable to test, is that there is a positive relationship between homicide and the degree of involvement in social relationships. In other words, the more one has to do with other people, the more likely it is that the individual will commit homicide.[25]

The conclusions they draw from these hypotheses and tests are, first, that homicide is directly dependent on the amount of 'vertical' external restraint. That is, the lower the class, the more external restraints and rules to follow, and the more likely

one is to commit homicide. Second, homicide is directly dependent on the strength of the 'horizontal' external restraints -- the more caught up one is in friends, family, and others, the more likely one will commit homicide.[26]

Stuart Palmer, in The Violent Society, uses a different, but related, theoretical construct in his discussion of homicide. His key concept is 'reciprocity,' which means just that -- having one's actions appropriately recompensed. He says that one sided restraints -- like those of whites on blacks, at least before the Civil Rights movement, engenders what Durkheim would call a low level of integration and, in his own terms, high unreciprocity. High unreciprocity is linked to high violence rates. This is really not all that different from Henry and Short. They suggest that frustrating conditions breed homicidal offenders. Palmer suggests that having one's actions un- or undercompensated can lead to frustration, which can cause aggression.[27]

C. WHO KILLS?

Above and beyond patterns in sex, race, age, and residence, who are the victims of homicide? Suicide is unique, because it is the only crime in which the victim and the offender are one and the same. Not so homicide. Examining the demographics of the victims of homicide would seem, at first glance, not to give any clue whatsoever to who commits the crime and what is the nature of the relationship between the victim and the offender.

Above, I noted the general belief that homicide is intraracial -- whites kill whites, blacks kill blacks[28] and also that the same cannot be said of men and women. Men kill both men and women, and women kill men, most often, but they occasionally

kill other women. Emile Durkheim discussed homicide to a certain extent in his book Suicide. It is his contention, which Short and Henry echo in more sophisticated form, that family life stimulates murder.[29] Marvin E. Wolfgang, author of Patterns in Criminal Homicide, 62 years later, modifies this sentiment to include people outside the family. He says that a high proportion (65%) of all homicides occur between 'primary group' contacts, the primary group being close friends and relatives.[30] He does differentiate, though, between races: whites are most likely to be slain by a relative, while blacks are most likely to be killed by a close friend. ("With friends like these...")[31] Finally, he points out a trend he has noticed but is nowhere else verified: the closer the relationship between victim and offender, the greater the violence of the killing.[32]

Alan Blun and Gary Fisher, psychologists and authors of the article "Women who Kill" generalize about female murderers. They say that usually women murder husbands, children, or lovers, while the trend is much less marked for men. This is due, in part, to the fact that women are less likely to find themselves in violence-inducing situations outside the home: they do not take part in barroom brawls. Additionally, women are less likely to have an economic motivation for their actions.[33] These generalizations cannot be tested with my data, since they tally victims and not offenders.

Women are not victims of homicide as often as men are; neither are they offenders as often. Blun and Fisher arrive at conclusions as to why this too is true. Basically, women are

socialized to be less aggressive, are more closely supervised, and are taught to conform. Males are rewarded for aggressive behavior. Women also have a more restricted sphere of activities: they are principally in the home, so when they do kill, they kill those around them.[24]

To summarize: whites generally kill whites and blacks kill blacks. People generally kill those close to them -- friends and relatives. Women usually kill those in the family. The dominance of males among offenders is probably due to cultural mores that tend to sanction violence among men. Short and Henry say that frustration leads to aggression. Stuart Palmer holds that unreciprocity causes violent aggression. The two theories are merely modifications of the same theme.

Short and Henry's theories are a good starting place for the next discussion: the relationship between suicide and homicide. I've already pointed out that homicide is not as well linked to fluctuations in the economy as suicide. In what other ways can the two destructive actions be linked?

SUICIDE AND HOMICIDE

A. IS THERE A RELATIONSHIP?

On this question, theoreticians range all over the map of possible answers. In their most basic form, suicide and homicide are linked if only because each involves killing. They are two end results of aggression. Beyond this point, there is little unanimity.

Durkheim classifies suicides into three groups and says that some sorts are more compatible than others with suicide.[35] The most prevalent sort of suicide -- anomic -- which is produced by

feelings of anomie, is very compatible with homicide.[36] Anomie also produces homicides.[37] Durkheim holds that anomic suicides and homicides are two manifestations of the same impulse and that they are complementary -- where there are many homicides there will be few suicides, and vice versa.[38]

Short and Henry modify Durkheim's theory about the compatibility of suicide and homicide by turning to their trusty theory of frustration. They say that frustration is due to the loss of status relative to others in the same 'status reference system' (one's peers). They suggest further that high status category members "lose position relative to low status categories during business contractions while low status categories lose status position relative to high status categories during business expansion."[39] Since they associate high status members with suicide and low status with homicide,[40] and frustration with aggression,[41] this statement means, in effect, that depressions engender suicides and business expansion engenders homicide. Like Durkheim, Short and Henry see suicide as closely linked and sharing the same source -- anomie or frustration.[42] One query calls the assumption of identical source into question: if they are linked in this way, why doesn't the economy play as great a role in homicide as it does in suicide?

A final and much more confusing theory of the link between suicide and homicide is Palmer's. He reviews the leading theories of suicide and homicide and decides that they are all inconsistent and comes up with his own theory instead. Like his theory for homicide -- that it is due to high unreciprocity --

the theory of suicide hinges on reciprocity. Suicide is due to one of two things, he says: either sustained low tension (high reciprocity) or large scale drops in tension (increase in reciprocity).[43] This is where things get slightly bewildering, because he says that low tension -- high reciprocity -- is not as wonderful as it would seem. It creates frustration and aggression.[44] Why, Palmer never says.

Homicide and suicide are, of course, linked in a non-theoretical fashion: sometimes a person kills someone else and then himself. Short and Henry say that mostly the scenario works this way: the aggressor perceives another as the source of frustration, kills that person and is left with a sense of frustration if he has destroyed a source of nurturance (parent, spouse). This frustration can now not be blamed on another, and the person takes his own life.[45] Marvin E. Wolfgang says that usually the homicide victim in homicide-suicide cases is a relative or paramour, which fits in well with Short and Henry's theory.[46]

Having covered the theoretical ground, I will investigate how suicide and homicide are linked in my data. A comparison of rates, timing, and demographics should wrap up the statistical part of this paper and make it possible to come to some conclusions about the effect of the depression on the citizens of the United States.

B. COMPARISON OF SUICIDE AND HOMICIDE STATISTICS

1. Correlations

This is the last foray into statistics, so hold your breath and plunge right in. I've spent two chapters discussing suicide

and homicide statistics. Some hold that suicide and homicide are theoretically linked -- they rise and fall together or one rises as the other falls. There is disagreement, so I decided to compute the correlation coefficient of both the suicide and homicide rates and the correlation coefficient of the changes in the suicide and homicide rates. Statisticians say that the correlation coefficient explains how much of the change in one variable can be explained by another. If the two have a direct positive relationship -- they vary together all of the time -- the correlation coefficient will be 1. If the relationship is the opposite -- one variable increases while the other decreases by the same proportion, the correlation coefficient will be -1. Any value in between -1 and 1 is an indication of how well the two variables are related. If they are not at all related, the correlation coefficient will be 0.

Computing the correlation coefficient for my data, I found that the national suicide rate was closely linked to the national homicide rate. The correlation coefficient was .8183. It is positive, which means that the suicide rate goes up goes up most of the time that the homicide rate does. This correlation coefficient gives a significance of .001, which means that we can say the two variables are connected with .999 percent certainty. [When doing a test for significance, one is testing what is called the null hypothesis -- that the variables are completely unrelated. If the correlation coefficient is high enough, we can reject the null hypothesis with varying degrees of certainty. The lower the significance level, the better, but anything below

0.05 is very good, because we can be at least 95 percent certain that the variables are linked.]

Not only are the plain rates connected, the changes from one year to the next are conclusively linked. I wanted to find out if the changes in each of the rates were connected and arrived at a correlation coefficient of .7261, not as high as .8183 for the rates themselves. However, this coefficient proved that the two variables are also linked to a .999 certainty level.

There are two things to point out here. First, both correlation coefficients are positive. This means that when one variable increases, the other acts in the same way. This discovery is directly counter to Palmer's assertion that in literate societies there is an inverse relation between suicide and homicide.[47] For that to be true, the correlation coefficient would have to be negative. This means that whatever it is that generates suicide is either the same as or closely linked to that which generates homicide. I am too cautious to claim that the causes are the same because I did not find that economic factors played the same sort of role for both variables. Obviously, both are culminations of many things, but suicide is more directly dependent on the economy than is homicide.

2. Demographics

Beyond their basic correlation, what are the similarities and differences between homicide and suicide? This brief recap of the demographics of suicide and homicide will, I hope, also be a convenient way to summarize this part of the paper and to bring the two topics together.

a. Gender

Men are both more likely to commit suicide and to be the victims of homicide than are women, throughout the 1900-1940 period. For suicide, the percentage of female victims decreased by two percentage points during the depression -- from 23.2 to 20.9%. However, for female homicide victims the percentage changed only by five hundredths of a percent from pre-depression to depression times (19.96 to 19.91%). There are thus also slightly fewer female homicide victims than suicides. The depression did not have much effect on the gender distribution of either way of dying.

b. Age

The largest group of victims of homicide, for both men and women, was between the ages 20 and 39. This pattern did not change during the depression, but the groups were more concentrated -- more people fell into that age range during the depression. Suicide patterns, on the other hand, did change during the depression. Before the depression, men were grouped mainly in the 35-54 age range, while during the depression they were principally between 40 and 59. Women's ages shifted ten years -- from 20-39 (pre-depression) to 30-49 (depression). The most important change that took place was the amazingly heavy concentration in the male 50-54 group during the depression. All in all, the patterns did not change for homicide; they did for suicide. Primarily older people, as a whole, were suicides, while homicide victims had not even reached middle age.

e. Timing

Since there was only four years' worth of data for homicides, the homicide stats may be slightly off. Probably the best way to show the seasonal and monthly differences between suicide and homicide is to examine the chart below, which ranks the months from most to least victims:

Table 18: Homicide victims and suicides by month

homicide	suicide
July	May
Aug	April
Oct	June
Dec	March
Sept	July
June	Aug
May	Oct
March	Sept
April	Dec
Nov	Nov
Jan	Jan
Feb	Feb

Or, seasonally,

homicide	suicide
summer-fall	spring-summer
spring	fall
winter	winter

It is notable that winter is the time for least killings -- apparently physical hardships are not conducive to killing.

CONCLUSION

In these last two sections I've investigated theoretical models that discuss victims of homicide and suicide, discussed the normal and depression patterns of suicide and homicide, and investigated the similarities and differences between the two. I found that suicide were more affected by the depression than were the homicides. This difference of affect can convincingly be traced to the fact that the economy did not play a large role in

c. Race

Before and during the depression, non-whites committed about 3% of all suicide; the pattern did not change. Before the depression, non-whites numbered about 43% of all victims of homicide, while during the depression that proportion rose to 48%. The change is quite noticeable. Non-whites were at all times more likely to be killed than to kill themselves, and this became even more pronounced during the the depression.

The age ranges for non-white suicides did not change -- men: 25-44, women: 20-39 -- nor did the age ranges for homicide victims -- men: 20-39, women: 15-34. Suicides were, on the whole, slightly older than were homicide victims.

d. Residence

Throughout the 1900-1940 period, there was always slightly more urban than rural violent death. During the depression, there was about three percent more than previously in rural areas, but urban areas still claimed over half of the suicides and homicide victims.

For suicides, there was more non-white urban suicide during the depression than previously. There was no monumental change with homicide. On average, before the depression, non-whites were the victims of about 42% of all homicide, urban and rural. During the depression, both increase -- rural from 42 to 44 percent; urban from 42 to 51 percent. Urban non-white homicide victims were more numerous during the depression than before. For both suicide and homicide, there are a few more non-white urban victims than before.

homicide, as it did in suicide. Although the two are closely correlated, they do not vary together with economic factors. Graph 19 shows the suicide rate, homicide rate, and unemployment rate measured on one set of axes. Generally, suicide rates rise and fall at the same times that unemployment rates do. Homicide rates seem to vary independently of either other variable.

GRAPH 19: SUICIDE, HOMICIDE, UNEMPLOYMENT 1906-1940



CHAPTER 4: ENDNOTES

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7. Palmer, p. 37.

8. Wolfgang, p. 191.

9. Blun and Fisher, p. 192.

10. Wolfgang, p. 213.

11. Blun and Fisher, p. 192.

12. Blun and Fisher, p. 191.

13. Henry and Short, p. 87.

14. Wolfgang, p. 65.

15. Palmer, p. 37.

16. Wolfgang, p. 223.

17. Wolfgang, p. 207.

18. Wolfgang, p. 84.

19. Émile Durkheim, Suicide: A Study in Sociology, Tr. by John A. Spaulding and George Simpson, (Glencoe: Free Press, 1951), p. 351.

20. Wolfgang, p. 99.

21. Palmer, p. 44; Wolfgang, p. 143.

22. Henry and Short, p. 14.

23. Henry and Short, p. 102.

24. See discussion in Chapter 3 for theories on status and suicide.

25. Henry and Short, pp. 94-95.

26. Henry and Short, pp. 94-95.

27. Palmer, p. 23.

28. Palmer, p. 23.

29. Durkheim, p. 351.

30. Wolfgang, p. 207.

31. Wolfgang, p. 207.

32. Wolfgang, p. 208.

33. Blun and Fisher, p. 192.

34. Blun and Fisher, p. 191.

35. Durkheim, pp. 355-356.

36. Durkheim, p. 356.

37. Durkheim, p. 359.

38. Durkheim, p. 351.

39. Henry and Short, p. 56.

40. Henry and Short, p. 55.

41. Henry and Short, p. 14.

42. Henry and Short, p. 55.

43. Palmer, p. 99.

44. Palmer, p. 127.

45. Henry and Short, p. 117.

46. Wolfgang, p. 279.

47. Palmer, p. 107.

CONCLUSION

Much of what precedes concerns death, but the real topic is life; life and the stresses and strains it presents. The depression affected the individual and collective conscience. On the individual level are the suicide and homicide statistics that show how individuals reacted to hard times: in many cases, they took their own lives. The collective consciousness of deprivation, poverty, and want was expressed in factional movements, in movies, and in the literature of the era. Violence, anger, and despair were the daily fare of millions.

It is the collective consciousness of the depression that is most often encountered today in various forms. Historians research the movements like EPIC and delve into the psyches of people like Father Coughlin. Others ask survivors for their memories and impressions of hard times. All of these methods of inquiry into the depression experience become clouded by the element of time. Survivors tend to remember events and emotions selectively. Modern researchers talk about movements in terms of sociological theory. Modern playwrights and writers, who were children during depression years, infuse an often wretched past with songs of hope. Somewhere in between the actual depression gets lost.

I think that this study, cursory as it is, tries to delve a little deeper into life during the depression. The newspaper reports are dreary, yes, but the bank ads represent an attempt to turn the newspaper readers' eyes from the bleak present to possibilities for survival. The literature and economics of the

depression show the depths to which the country sank and also how charity and camaraderie could rise from the ashes of ruined lives.

It is the investigation of suicide and homicide that touches a heretofore unexamined realm of individual reactions to the depression. Suicide patterns changed so radically during the depression that one can pinpoint characteristics of the true victims of the depression. Generally, they were white, middle-aged residents of urban areas. More than half were male. A surprising proportion or those men were between the ages 50 and 54. Homicide patterns did not really change noticeably during the depression, which lends support to the claim that economic factors do not play a large role in the determination of the victims of homicide.

The depression, then, was destructive enough that some groups of people found it easier to die than to fight. The depression engendered violence in literature and in actuality. Both of these facts are tempered by the consideration that the depression did not, it seems, inspire some to kill others, nor did hope die a tragic death. Both of these viewpoints are reflected in current views of life in the Great Depression.

APPENDIX

This is a moderately technical discussion of the relationship between suicide, homicide, and economic variables that I chose. I chose three variables as economic indicators -- unemployment, wages, and bond ratings. Other historians and economists have used these and recognize their validity. The list of variables gives first, the name I used for it, and briefly, what it means or represents and where I found it:

VARIABLES:

NDR - National Death Rate - national death rate per 1,000 population. From the Mortality Statistics (all death variables are).
ODR - Ohio Death Rate - Ohio death rate per 1,000 pop.
NSR - National Suicide Rate - national suicide rate per 100,000 population.
OSR - Ohio Suicide Rate - Ohio suicide rate per 100,000 pop.
NHR - National Homicide Rate - national homicide rate (deaths by homicide) per 100,000 pop.
OHR - Ohio Homicide rate - Ohio homicide rate per 100,000 pop.
UNEM - National Unemployment Rate - as percentage of the civilian labor force. From Historical Statistics of the U.S..
WAGES - The per capita income. From Hist. Stats.
TNDR through TWAGES - the yearly change in the statistic
CHNDR through CHWAGES - the lagged change in the statistic

T before a variable name means that it is a measure of how much that statistic changed from one year to the next. That is, if unemployment (UNEM) is measured as 3.2 percent of the Civilian Labor Force this year and as 4.0 percent next year, TUNEM is +0.8.

CH before a variable name means exactly the same thing as T, but lagged one year. Where TUNEM means the change from one year to the next, CHUNEM indicates this same value pushed back a year so that one is using the change in the unemployment rate from the year before. This device is used to test the hypothesis that deaths are due not to current economic factors but to those of the year before. In other words, are vital consequences of economics immediate or delayed?

HYPOTHESIS: The change in the death data is in some measure attributable to the economic data for that year or for the year previously.

DISCUSSION of results: Ideally, one would like to find a one-to-one relationship between the variables: if the unemployment rate goes up by a notch, then so should the suicide or homicide rate.

I chose the economic measures listed above to find out which, if any, played the greatest role in violent deaths from 1900 to 1940. The 'r square' term measures how much explanation the variables give each other -- how much the variation of one is paralleled or explained by the other. Here I use it to measure what role the different economic variables have in determining the death variables.

I will attach the computer generated SPSS multiple regression results at the end of this appendix, but will briefly summarize them here. What I was looking for was the best explanation, using economic variables, of changes (TNDR, TNSR, etc.) in the death variables. For both the national and the Ohio death rates, the best equation used TUNEM and CHWAGE. In other words, death rates can be partially explained by a combination of the change in the unemployment rate from one year to the next and the change in income that occurred from a year previously to the present. The r square statistic for NDR is .20, which means that 20% of the change in national death can be attributed to the economic variables mentioned, while for ODR, it is .28, which means that 28% of the change in Ohio death can be attributed to these variables. In both cases, the wage statistic is more important (more heavily weighted) than unemployment.

For both Ohio and national suicide rates, the best explanation is afforded by TUNEM and TWAGE. With hopes that I won't scare readers away, here are their equations:

$$TNSR = -.335 + .384TWAGE + .760TUNEM \qquad r^2 = .47$$

$$TOSR = .132 - .315TWAGE + .191TUNEM \qquad r^2 = .19$$

The r square value for TNSR is important: the equation given explains nearly <u>half</u> of the change in the suicide rates. What goes into this equation? An intercept (not important), TWAGE, with a coefficient that is quite significant, and TUNEM, with an even more significant and weightier coefficient. This is the best equation generated in all of the regression analysis. Ohio's suicide rate, on the other hand, is the best of the available ones for it, but it comes nowhere near the significance of the one for TNSR.

For the homicide rates TNHR and TOHR, the case is not nearly as clear cut. The best equation for TNHR involves TUNEM and CHWAGE, though TUNEM is weighted more heavily. The r is .34, so about a third of the change in the national homicide rate can be explained with this equation, which has a high standard error (bad), but a relatively low F term (good). TOHR affords a problem, because there are seemingly two equivalent (in terms of significance) equations. One involves CHWAGE and CHUNEM, the other TUNEM and CHWAGE, but neither explains more than 4% of the changes in Ohio's homicide rate.

CONCLUSIONS:

a. Deaths can, to a degree, be attributed to economic factors.

b. Deaths (TNDR, TODR) are dependent on the wage change that occurred from last year to the present more than they are on current unemployment.

c. This test shows that homicides are not at all closely related to these economic variables. There must be others I've missed or they just aren't related to economic factors.

d. None of the Ohio equations are very good, largely because the determining variables are national, and what are needed (not available, though) is local economic data.

e. The national suicide rate is provided with the best equation for any death variable here, and it rests mainly on current changes in the unemployment rate.

f. The suicide rate also rests, to a lesser degree, on current wage changes. Altogether, suicide is a reaction to economic forces that occur within one year.

g. Economic factors cannot explain all deaths. The best equation doesn't even explain half of all suicides. However, at least for suicide, economic factors are a very large determining factor.

h. The suicide equation shows how important a job is.

SUMMARY of results: The following table is a summary of the results of the multiple regression tests, the more detailed results that this summarizes are at the end of this section. Basically, this table shows the four possible equations for every dependent (death) variable. The variable names are as explained above. The other terms used here are:

a. **intercept** -- the point on the dependent variable axis (y) at which the equation given hits the axis when the determining variables (economic) are zero;

b. **B** under an economic variable name gives the coefficient of that variable -- it shows how much influence each determining variable has on the dependent variables, as the greater number of the two (+ or -) has the greater influence;

c. **Sig. T.** measures the significance of the coefficients and it must be less than .05 to be significant;

d. **equation** gives the final equation, using the intercept, the coefficients, and the determining variables.

e. **R** is the same as before: it measures the statistical explanation provided by the two variables taken together. The higher, the better (.10 means that the two variables explain 10% of the variation in the other);

f. **S.E.** stands for Standard Error, which shows how much of the dependent variable is not determined by the equation -- the standard deviation units around the regression plane. Small is best, ideally less than one.

g. **Sig. F.** is like a t test -- it shows what degree of confidence one can have in the equation. Small is best, preferably .05 and smaller, which will afford 95% or more confidence level.

Using the criteria just discussed -- optimal size of r, size of S.E., etc. -- I've put check marks next to the best equations for each dependent variable. I've discussed these equations in a general way above, and I hope the chart, with these notes, is self-explanatory.

ATTACHED is the computer generated multiple regression. Many thanks are due to my father and his IBM XT for helping me create this and analyze it. This is the raw data upon which the summary table above and the other conclusions above are based.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE	INTERCEPT	TWAGE B	TWAGE SIG. T.	TUNEM B	TUNEM SIG. T.	CHWAGE B	CHWAGE SIG. T.	CHUNEM B	CHUNEM SIG. T.	EQUATION	r^2	S.E.	SIG. F.
TNDR	−.239	.169	.407	−.241	.241					−.239 + .169 TW − .241 TUN	.12	1.2	.18
	.188					−.445	.030	−.115	.558	.188 − .445 CHW − .115 CHUN	.17	1.2	.08
	.122			−.234	.196	−.340	.065			.122 − .234 TUN − .340 CHW	.20 ✓	1.2	.04 ✓
	−.378	.300	.119					.132	.486	−.378 + .300 TW + .132 CHUN	.09	1.2	.27
TODR	−.168	.166	.403	−.314	.119					−.168 + .166 TW − .314 TUN	.17	1.2	.08
	−.229					−.497	.014	−.130	.497	−.229 − .497 CHW − .130 CHUN	.21	1.2	.04
	.221			−.298	.087	−.370	.036			.221 − .298 TUN − .370 CHW	.28 ✓	1.1 ✓	.01 ✓
	−.347	.332	.083					.146	.438	−.347 + .332 TW + .146 CHUN	.11	1.3	.19
TNSR	−.335	.384	.021	.761	.0000					−.335 + .384 TW + .761 TUN	.47 ✓	.74 ✓	.0002 ✓
	−.375					.543	.007	.209	.269	−.375 + .543 CHW + .209 CHUN	.24	.89	.02
	−.277			.512	.002	.332	.032			−.277 + .512 TUN + .332 CHW	.45	.75	.003
	−.078	.047	.814					−.014	.945	−.078 + .047 TW − .014 CHUN	.002	1.0	.97
TOSR	.132	−.315	.114	.191	.331					.132 − .315 TW + .191 TUN	.19 ✓	.64 ✓	.06 ✓
	−.098					.257	.223	.203	.333	−.098 + .257 CHW + .203 CHUN	.06	.69	.42
	−.038			.307	.111	.097	.605			−.038 + .307 TUN + .097 CHW	.12	.67	.18
	.174	−.396	.036					.017	.924	.174 − .396 TW + .017 CHUN	.16	.66	.09
TNHR	−.222	.278	.132	.614	.002					−.222 + .278 TW + .614 TUN	.30	1.1	.01
	−.318					.480	.019	.152	.434	−.318 + .480 CHW + .152 CHUN	.19	1.2	.06
	−.220			.416	.016	.316	.061			−.220 + .416 TUN + .316 CHW	.34 ✓	1.1 ✓	.004 ✓
	.063	−.002	.989					−.053	.789	.063 − .002 TW − .053 CHUN	.003	1.4	.96
TOHR	.033	−.047	.827	−.072	.741					.033 − .047 TW − .072 TUN	.004	.85	.94
	.103					−.202	.342	−.042	.844	.103 − .202 CHW − .042 CHUN	.04 ✓	.84 ✓	.61 ✓
	.090			−.007	.971	−.183	.357			.090 − .007 TUN − .183 CHW	.04 ✓	.84 ✓	.63
	6.189×10^{-3}	−.007	.969					.043	.828	.006 − .007 TW + .043 CHUN	.002	.85	.97

SPSS/PC has written 45 cases to the active file

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* * * * M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N * * * *

Listwise Deletion of Missing Data

Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. TODR

Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter TUNEM TWAGE

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
1.. TWAGE
2.. TUNEM

-.4561 * correlation (from other work)

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* * * * M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N * * * *

Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. TODR

Multiple R	.41461	← CORRELATION OF 2 VARIABLES TAKEN TOGETHER VS. TODR
R Square	.17190	← STAT. EXPLANATION PROVIDED BY THE 2 VARIABLES (17%)
Adjusted R Square	.11056	← REDUCED BY SAMPLE SIZE
Standard Error	1.21830	← S.DEV. UNITS AROUND REGRESSION PLANE (SMALL IS BEST) > ONE, NOT SO GOOD

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	2	8.31904	4.15952
Residual	27	40.07462	1.48425

F = 2.80245 Signif F = .0784 ← (like t test) want .0500 and smaller

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* * * * M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N * * * *

Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. TODR

FINAL EQUATION

TODR = -.168 + .166 TWAGE - .314 TUNEM

.166 TWAGE → TODR ← -.314 TUNEM

Variables in the Equation

Variable	B	SE B	Beta Coefficients	T	Sig T
TWAGE	.01109	.01305	.16584	.850	.4027
TUNEM	-.11396	.07081	-.31393	-1.609	.1192
(Constant)	-.16777	.27187		-.617	.5423

For a change in one data unit of TWAGE, TODR changes by .011

these are

must be less than .05 to be significant

See equation above

want these as close to 0 as possible

These are to be compared (greater ∧ is more important)

check signs - must be in the right direction

Values close to +1.00 or -1.00 are important

End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered.

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Equation Number 2 Dependent Variable.. TNDR

Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter TUNEM TWAGE

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
1.. TWAGE
2.. TUNEM

Multiple R .34969
R Square .12228
Adjusted R Square .05727
Standard Error 1.22168

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	2	5.61419	2.80709
Residual	27	40.29781	1.49251

F = 1.88078 Signif F = .1719

Equation Number 2 Dependent Variable.. TNDR

Variables in the Equation

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
TWAGE	.01101	.01309	.16902	.842	.4074
TUNEM	-.08508	.07101	-.24062	-1.198	.2412
(Constant)	-.23859	.27262		-.875	.3892

End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered.

Equation Number 3 Dependent Variable.. TNSR

Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter TUNEM TWAGE

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
1.. TWAGE
2.. TUNEM

Multiple R .68485
R Square .46903
Adjusted R Square .42969
Standard Error .74621

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	2	13.28032	6.64016

F = 11.92499 Signif F = .0002

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* * * * M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N * * * *

Equation Number 3 Dependent Variable.. TNSR

Variables in the Equation

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
TWAGE	.01966	7.99270E-03	.38420	2.460	.0206
TUNEM	.21126	.04337	.76081	4.871	.0000
(Constant)	-.33501	.16652		-2.012	.0543

End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered.

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* * * * M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N * * * *

Equation Number 4 Dependent Variable.. TOSR

Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter TUNEM TWAGE

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
1.. TWAGE
2.. TUNEM

Multiple R	.43469
R Square	.18895
Adjusted R Square	.12887
Standard Error	.64482

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	2	2.61542	1.30771
Residual	27	11.22625	.41579

F = 3.14514 Signif F = .0592

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* * * * M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N * * * *

Equation Number 4 Dependent Variable.. TOSR

Variables in the Equation

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
TWAGE	-.01128	6.90667E-03	-.31518	-1.633	.1141
TUNEM	.03712	.03748	.19118	.990	.3309
(Constant)	.13216	.14389		.918	.3665

End Block Number 1 All requested variables

* * * * M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N * * * *

Equation Number 5 Dependent Variable.. TNHR

Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter TUNEM TWAGE

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
1.. TWAGE
2.. TUNEM

Multiple R .55092
R Square .30351
Adjusted R Square .25172
Standard Error 1.12834

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	2	14.97957	7.48979
Residual	27	34.37510	1.27315

F = 5.88287 Signif F = .0076

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* * * * M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N * * * *

Equation Number 5 Dependent Variable.. TNHR

---------- Variables in the Equation ----------

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
TWAGE	.01875	.01209	.27753	1.551	.1324
TUNEM	.22493	.06558	.61335	3.430	.0020
(Constant)	-.22212	.25179		-.882	.3854

End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered.

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* * * * M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N * * * *

Equation Number 6 Dependent Variable.. TDHR

Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter TUNEM TUAGE

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
1.. TUAGE
2.. TUNEM

Multiple R .06605
R Square .00436
Adjusted R Square -.06937
Standard Error .84809

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	2	.08516	.04258
Residual	27	19.43351	.71976

F = .05916 Signif F = .9427

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* * * * M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N * * * *

Equation Number 6 Dependent Variable.. TDHR

---------- Variables in the Equation ----------

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
TWAGE	-2.00613E-03	9.08713E-03	-.04702	-.221	.8277
TUNEM	-.01647	.04931	-.07144	-.334	.7407
(Constant)	.03393	.18932		.179	.8591

End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered.

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* * * * M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N * * * *

Equation Number 7 Dependent Variable.. TDHR

Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter CHUNEM CHWAGE

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
1.. CHWAGE
2.. CHUNEM

* * * * MULTIPLE REGRESSION * * * *

Equation Number 7 Dependent Variable.. TODR

Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter CHUNEM CHUAGE

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
1.. CHUAGE
2.. CHUNEM

Multiple R .45703
R Square .20880
Adjusted R Square .15027
Standard Error 1.19079

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	2	10.10826	5.05413
Residual	27	38.28540	1.41798

F = 3.56432 Signif F = .0423

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* * * * MULTIPLE REGRESSION * * * *

Equation Number 7 Dependent Variable.. TODR

Variables in the Equation

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
CHUAGE	-.03371	.01283	-.49703	-2.627	.0140
CHUNEM	-.04777	.06948	-.13007	-.687	.4977
(Constant)	.29985	.26417		1.135	.2663

End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered.

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* * * * MULTIPLE REGRESSION * * * *

Equation Number 8 Dependent Variable.. THDR

Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter CHUNEM CHUAGE

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
1.. CHUAGE
2.. CHUNEM

Multiple R .40856
R Square .16695
Adjusted R Square .10556
Standard Error 1.18998

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	2	7.67878	3.83939
Residual	27	38.03827	1.41623

F = 2.71133 Signif F = .0865

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* * * * MULTIPLE REGRESSION * * * *

Equation Number 8 Dependent Variable.. THDR

Variables in the Equation

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
CHUAGE	-.02734	.01282	-.44453	-2.133	.0421
CHUNEM	-.04114	.06944	-.11502	-.593	.5587
(Constant)	.18779	.26379		.711	.4830

End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered.

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* * * * MULTIPLE REGRESSION * * * *

Equation Number 9 Dependent Variable.. THDR

Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter CHUNEM CHUAGE

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
1.. CHUAGE

* * * * M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N * * * *

Equation Number 9 Dependent Variable.. TNSR

Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter CHUNEM CHWAGE

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
1.. CHWAGE
2.. CHUNEM

Multiple R	.49182
R Square	.24189
Adjusted R Square	.18373
Standard Error	.89164

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	2	6.84891	3.42445
Residual	27	21.46576	.79503

F = 4.30738 Signif F = .0238

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* * * * M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N * * * *

Equation Number 9 Dependent Variable.. TNSR

Variables in the Equation

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
CHWAGE	.02817	9.60829E-03	.54304	2.932	.0069
CHUNEM	.05864	.05203	.20874	1.127	.2697
(Constant)	-.37552	.19780		-1.898	.0684

End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered.

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* * * * M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N * * * *

Equation Number 10 Dependent Variable.. TOSR

Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter CHUNEM CHWAGE

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
1.. CHWAGE
2.. CHUNEM

Multiple R	.25058
R Square	.06279
Adjusted R Square	-.00463
Standard Error	.69316

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	2	.86911	.43456
Residual	27	12.97255	.48046

F = .90445 Signif F = .4167

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* * * * M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N * * * *

Equation Number 10 Dependent Variable.. TOSP

Variables in the Equation

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
CHWAGE	9.328337E-03	7.46940E-03	.25702	1.248	.2227
CHUNEM	.03985	.04045	.20280	.985	.3333
(Constant)	-.09817	.15377		-.638	.5286

End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered.

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* * * * M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N * * * *

Equation Number 11 Dependent Variable.. TNHR

Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter CHUNEM CHWAGE

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
1.. CHWAGE
2.. CHUNEM

**** MULTIPLE REGRESSION ****

Equation Number 11 Dependent Variable.. TNHR

Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter CHUNEM CHUAGE

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
1.. CHUAGE
2.. CHUNEM

Multiple R .43720
R Square .19114
Adjusted R Square .13123
Standard Error 1.21596

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	2	9.43303	4.71651
Residual	27	39.92084	1.47855

F = 3.19023 Signif F = .0571

**** MULTIPLE REGRESSION ****

Equation Number 11 Dependent Variable.. TNHR

---------- Variables in the Equation ----------

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
CHUAGE	.03286	.01310	.47977	2.508	.0185
CHUNEM	.05640	.07095	.15208	.795	.4336
(Constant)	-.31766	.26775		-1.178	.2492

End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered.

**** MULTIPLE REGRESSION ****

Equation Number 12 Dependent Variable.. TOHR

Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter CHUNEM CHUAGE

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
1.. CHUAGE
2.. CHUNEM

Multiple R .18810
R Square .03538
Adjusted R Square -.03607
Standard Error .83507

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	2	.69060	.34530
Residual	27	18.82806	.69734

F = .49517 Signif F = .6149

**** MULTIPLE REGRESSION ****

Equation Number 12 Dependent Variable.. TOHR

---------- Variables in the Equation ----------

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
CHUAGE	-8.70094E-03	8.99862E-03	-.20201	-.967	.3420
CHUNEM	-9.69437E-03	.04873	-.04157	-.199	.8438
(Constant)	.10279	.18525		.555	.5835

End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered.

**** MULTIPLE REGRESSION ****

Equation Number 13 Dependent Variable.. TOHR

Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter TUNEM CHUAGE

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
1.. TUNEM
2.. CHUAGE

* * * * MULTIPLE REGRESSION * * * *

Equation Number 13 Dependent Variable.. TODR

Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter TUNEM CHWAGE

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
1.. TUNEM
2.. CHWAGE

Multiple R	.52823
R Square	.27903
Adjusted R Square	.22562
Standard Error	1.13677

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	2	13.50382	6.75191
Residual	27	34.87045	1.29224

F = 5.22474 Signif F = .0121

* * * * MULTIPLE REGRESSION * * * *

Equation Number 13 Dependent Variable.. TODR

Variables in the Equation

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
TUNEM	-.10835	.06109	-.29847	-1.774	.0374
CHWAGE	-.02511	.01141	-.37030	-2.200	.0365
(Constant)	.22107	.23874		.926	.3627

End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered.

* * * * MULTIPLE REGRESSION * * * *

Equation Number 14 Dependent Variable.. TNDR

Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter TUNEM CHWAGE

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
1.. TUNEM
2.. CHWAGE

Multiple R	.45608
R Square	.20801
Adjusted R Square	.14934
Standard Error	1.16049

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	2	9.54996	4.77498
Residual	27	36.36204	1.34674

F = 3.54558 Signif F = .0429

* * * * MULTIPLE REGRESSION * * * *

Equation Number 14 Dependent Variable.. TNDR

Variables in the Equation

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
TUNEM	-.08270	.06237	-.23290	-1.326	.1979
CHWAGE	-.02243	.01165	-.33961	-1.925	.0649
(Constant)	.12187	.24373		.500	.6211

End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered.

* * * * MULTIPLE REGRESSION * * * *

Equation Number 15 Dependent Variable.. TNSR

Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter TUNEM CHWAGE

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number

*** * * * M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N * * * ***

Equation Number 15 Dependent Variable.. TNSR

Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter TUNEM CHWAGE

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
1.. TUNEM
2.. CHWAGE

Multiple R	.67343
R Square	.45377
Adjusted R Square	.41331
Standard Error	.75685

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	2	12.84844	6.42422
Residual	27	15.46623	.57282

F = 11.21501 Signif F = .0003

*** * * * M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N * * * ***

Equation Number 15 Dependent Variable.. TNSR

Variables in the Equation

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
TUNEM	.14228	.04067	.51237	3.498	.0016
CHWAGE	.01721	7.59876E-03	.33169	2.264	.0318
(Constant)	-.27713	.15895		-1.743	.0926

End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered.

*** * * * M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N * * * ***

Equation Number 16 Dependent Variable.. TOSR

Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter TUNEM CHWAGE

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
1.. TUNEM
2.. CHWAGE

Multiple R	.34322
R Square	.11780
Adjusted R Square	.05246
Standard Error	.67250

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	2	1.63059	.81530
Residual	27	12.21107	.45226

F = 1.80271 Signif F = .1841

*** * * * M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N * * * ***

Equation Number 16 Dependent Variable.. TOSR

Variables in the Equation

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
TUNEM	.05955	.03614	.30671	1.648	.1110
CHWAGE	3.529376E-03	6.75192E-03	.09731	.523	.6054
(Constant)	-.03807	.14124		-.270	.7895

End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered.

*** * * * M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N * * * ***

Equation Number 17 Dependent Variable.. TNHR

Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter TUNEM CHWAGE

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
1.. TUNEM
2.. CHWAGE

* * * * MULTIPLE REGRESSION * * * *

Equation Number 17 Dependent Variable.. TNHR

Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter TUNEM CHWAGE

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
1.. TUNEM
2.. CHWAGE

Multiple R	.57909
R Square	.33534
Adjusted R Square	.28611
Standard Error	1.10226

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	2	16.55057	8.27529
Residual	27	32.80410	1.21497

F = 6.81112 Signif F = .0040

* * * * MULTIPLE REGRESSION * * * *

Equation Number 17 Dependent Variable.. TNHR

Variables in the Equation

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
TUNEM	.15249	.05924	.41594	2.574	.0159
CHWAGE	.02162	.01107	.31560	1.953	.0612
(Constant)	-.22017	.23150		-.951	.3500

End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered.

* * * * MULTIPLE REGRESSION * * * *

Equation Number 18 Dependent Variable.. TOHR

Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter TUNEM CHWAGE

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
1.. TUNEM
2.. CHWAGE

Multiple R	.18443
R Square	.03401
Adjusted R Square	-.03754
Standard Error	.83566

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	2	.66371	.33195
Residual	27	18.85476	.69832

F = .47536 Signif F = .6268

* * * * MULTIPLE REGRESSION * * * *

Equation Number 18 Dependent Variable.. TOHR

Variables in the Equation

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
TUNEM	-1.61727E-03	.04491	-7.015E-03	-.036	.9715
CHWAGE	-7.86607E 03	8.38998E-03	-.18063	-.938	.3568
(Constant)	.09052	.17551		.516	.6102

End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered.

* * * * MULTIPLE REGRESSION * * * *

Equation Number 19 Dependent Variable.. TODR

Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter CHUNEM TUAGE

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
1.. TUAGE
2.. CHUNEM

* * * * MULTIPLE REGRESSION * * * *

Equation Number 19 Dependent Variable.. TODR

Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter CHUNEM TWAGE

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
1.. TWAGE
2.. CHUNEM

Multiple R	.33594
R Square	.11286
Adjusted R Square	.04714
Standard Error	1.26098

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	2	5.46159	2.73079
Residual	27	42.93208	1.59008

F = 1.71740 Signif F = .1986

* * * * MULTIPLE REGRESSION * * * *

Equation Number 19 Dependent Variable.. TODR

Variables in the Equation

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
TWAGE	.02221	.01236	.33206	1.798	.0834
CHUNEM	.05345	.06784	.14553	.788	.4376
(Constant)	-.34696	.27268		-1.272	.2141

End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered.

* * * * MULTIPLE REGRESSION * * * *

Equation Number 20 Dependent Variable.. TNDR

Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter CHUNEM TWAGE

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
1.. TWAGE
2.. CHUNEM

Multiple R	.30400
R Square	.09242
Adjusted R Square	.02519
Standard Error	1.24229

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	2	4.24303	2.12152
Residual	27	41.66897	1.54330

F = 1.37467 Signif F = .2701

* * * * MULTIPLE REGRESSION * * * *

Equation Number 20 Dependent Variable.. TNDR

Variables in the Equation

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
TWAGE	.01957	.01217	.30038	1.608	.1195
CHUNEM	.04726	.06683	.13211	.707	.4856
(Constant)	-.37822	.26864		-1.408	.1705

End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered.

* * * * MULTIPLE REGRESSION * * * *

Equation Number 21 Dependent Variable.. TNSR

Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter CHUNEM TWAGE

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
1.. TWAGE
2.. CHUNEM

*** * * * M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N * * * ***

Equation Number 21 Dependent Variable.. TNSR

Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter CHUNEM TWAGE

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
1.. TWAGE
2.. CHUNEM

Multiple R	.05099
R Square	.00260
Adjusted R Square	-.07128
Standard Error	1.02272

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	2	.07361	.03680
Residual	27	28.24106	1.04597

F = .03519 Signif F = .9655

*** * * * M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N * * * ***

Equation Number 21 Dependent Variable.. TNSR

---------- Variables in the Equation ----------

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
TWAGE	2.383034E-03	.01002	.04657	.238	.8139
CHUNEM	-3.83526E-03	.05502	-.01365	-.070	.9449
(Constant)	-.07848	.22116		-.355	.7254

End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered.

*** * * * M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N * * * ***

Equation Number 22 Dependent Variable.. TOSR

Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter CHUNEM TWAGE

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
1.. TWAGE
2.. CHUNEM

Multiple R	.39972
R Square	.15977
Adjusted R Square	.09754
Standard Error	.65631

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	2	2.21154	1.10577
Residual	27	11.63012	.43075

F = 2.56711 Signif F = .0954

*** * * * M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N * * * ***

Equation Number 22 Dependent Variable.. TOSR

---------- Variables in the Equation ----------

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
TWAGE	-.01417	6.43167E-03	-.39605	-2.203	.0363
CHUNEM	3.382265E-03	.03531	.01722	.096	.9244
(Constant)	.17401	.14192		1.226	.2307

End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered.

*** * * * M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N * * * ***

Equation Number 23 Dependent Variable.. TNHR

Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter CHUNEM TWAGE

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
1.. TWAGE
2.. CHUNEM

*** * * * M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N * * * ***

Equation Number 23 Dependent Variable.. TNHR

Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter CHUNEM TWAGE

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
1.. TWAGE
2.. CHUNEM

Multiple R	.05238
R Square	.00274
Adjusted R Square	-.07113
Standard Error	1.35016

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	2	.13542	.06771
Residual	27	49.21924	1.82293

F = .03714 Signif F = .9636

*** * * * M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N * * * ***

Equation Number 23 Dependent Variable.. TNHR

Variables in the Equation

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
TWAGE	-1.89051E-04	.01323	-2.798E-03	-.014	.9887
CHUNEM	-.01960	.07263	-.05285	-.270	.7893
(Constant)	.06333	.29196		.217	.8299

End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered.

*** * * * M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N * * * ***

Equation Number 24 Dependent Variable.. TOHR

Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter CHUNEM TWAGE

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
1.. TWAGE
2.. CHUNEM

Multiple R	.04519
R Square	.00203
Adjusted R Square	-.07189
Standard Error	.84938

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	2	.03969	.01985
Residual	27	19.47897	.72144

F = .02751 Signif F = .9729

*** * * * M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N * * * ***

Equation Number 24 Dependent Variable.. TOHR

Variables in the Equation

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
TWAGE	-3.17796E-04	8.32366E-03	-7.480E-03	-.038	.9698
CHUNEM	.01004	.04569	.04306	.220	.8277
(Constant)	6.189092E-03	.18367		.034	.9734

End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered.

This procedure was completed at 0:10:53

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